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ABSTRACT 
 
JEFFREY P. LOZITO: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF ATTENTION DURING IMPLICIT 
MEMORY RETRIEVAL 
(Under the direction of Neil W. Mulligan) 
 
  
 Implicit memory is memory for information that is not driven by conscious 
processing. This study investigated the role of attention during implicit memory retrieval 
across four experiments using a test-phase division of attention. Implicit retrieval is 
dissociable into perceptual and conceptual forms. Implicit retrieval is further dissociable 
into tests that involve stimulus identification or stimulus production. Several lines of 
research make predictions about implicit retrieval in general, and with respect to these 
two dissociations. 
 The present study used four implicit tests that can be classified according to each 
of these two dimensions. Experiment 1 used a perceptual identification test; Experiment 
2 used a word-stem completion test; Experiment 3 used a category exemplar production 
test; and Experiment 4 used a category verification test. Attention was divided during the 
test-phase only with one of several secondary tasks. It was found that, across all 
experiments, none of the secondary tasks reduced levels of priming for any of the 
implicit tests. Further, implicit retrieval had no detrimental effects on performance for 
any of the secondary tasks. All of the above support the idea that implicit retrieval is 
automatic. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 During the course of a typical day, how often is one forced to perform two tasks 
simultaneously? The ability to multi-task is increasingly becoming a part of our everyday 
lives. For example, how many times during the course of a day do you see someone 
driving while using a cellular phone? What happens when we engage in two tasks 
simultaneously? A common belief is that people cannot perform two tasks 
simultaneously as well as they could perform each task independently. Even jokes, such 
as saying that someone is unable to walk and chew gum at the same time, seem to 
corroborate such beliefs. Retrieving information from memory is something we 
continually do. Because it is sometimes done in conjunction with other tasks (e.g., 
maintaining a conversation with someone while simultaneously trying to remember who 
exactly they are!), it is important to understand the effects of distraction on 
remembering. The key question that will guide the rest of this paper is whether our 
memory is as effective when remembering something while simultaneously performing a 
second task (i.e., when one is distracted) compared to remembering when not distracted. 
 In the laboratory, the effects of distraction are studied across two conditions: 
divided attention (DA) and full attention (FA). In the DA condition, participants must 
simultaneously respond to two concurrent tasks. Performance in this condition is 
compared to the FA condition, where participants perform only one of the two tasks. 
Dividing attention during memory encoding has a long tradition and the large, 
deleterious effects on subsequent performance are both well-documented and consistent 
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(Anderson & Craik, 1974; Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, Thompson, 1984; Craik, Govoni, 
Naveh-Benjamin, Anderson, 1996; Murdock, 1965). In a typical DA paradigm, 
participants study a list of items (e.g., words, pictures, or sentences). Some participants 
study items while simultaneously performing a secondary task (the DA condition) and 
others study with no secondary task (the FA condition). Typically the test is presented 
under FA; that is, attention is manipulated only during memory encoding. 
In a typical study, Baddeley et al. (1984), in a series of nine experiments, used a 
variety of secondary tasks (e.g., a card-sorting task or a digit load task) and consistently 
documented the detrimental effects of dividing attention during encoding on free-recall, 
cued-recall, and recognition memory. Baddeley et al. (1984) also found graded effects of 
DA by comparing the effects of an easy secondary task (e.g., randomly placing a card into 
one of four piles) with the effects of a more challenging secondary task (e.g., placing a 
card into one of four piles based on its suit). While studying the list of words, 
participants simultaneously performed either the more or less challenging secondary 
task. Memory for the study items was worse following the more challenging secondary 
task. 
Studies on the role of attention during episodic memory retrieval, however, are a 
more recent development in the literature, yielding inconsistent results. Specifically, 
some studies find large DA effects (e.g., Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Fernandes & 
Moscovitch, 2000, 2002, 2003; Gooding, Mayes, van Eijk, Meudell, & MacDonald, 1999; 
Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997; Hicks & Marsh, 2000; Jacoby, 1991; Lozito & 
Mulligan, 2006; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997; Rohrer & Pashler, 2003) whereas others 
do not (e.g., Anderson, Craik, Naveh-Benjamin, 1998; Cinan, 2003; Craik et al., 1996; 
Craik, Naveh-Benjamin, Ishaik, & Anderson, 2000; Logan & Delheimer, 2001; Naveh-
Benjamin, Craik, Guez, Dori, 1998; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Gavrilescu, & Anderson, 
2000a; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Perretta, & Tonev, 2000b; Naveh-Benjamin & Guez, 
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2000). In light of these empirical disparities, conclusions regarding the interplay 
between attention and episodic retrieval have also been inconsistent. In the following 
section of the paper, I will review this body of research and address the role of attention 
during episodic retrieval.
  
 
 
CHAPTER II 
DIVIDED ATTENTION DURING EPISODIC RETRIEVAL 
 
In a typical experiment, participants study a list of items (under FA conditions) 
and later take a memory test for those items. Some participants take the memory test 
while simultaneously performing a secondary task and others take the test with no 
secondary task. Baddeley et al. (1984) performed the first comprehensive study into the 
effects of dividing attention during memory retrieval. Unlike the effects of performing 
these tasks during encoding, Baddeley et al. found that, when performed concurrently 
with memory retrieval, neither secondary task affected memory performance. The 
finding of little or no decline in memory performance when attention is divided at 
retrieval is typical of numerous studies that examine this phenomenon (Craik et al., 
1996; Craik et al. 2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000a; 
Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000b; Naveh-Benjamin & Guez, 2000). 
From these results, Baddeley et al. (1984) concluded that retrieval processes are 
automatic and do not compete for attentional resources. Subsequent research has since 
disputed this claim (Craik et al., 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 2000a; Naveh-Benjamin et 
al. 2000b). Craik et al. also had participants perform a concurrent task during memory 
retrieval. However, this study provided two assessments of the role of attention in 
memory retrieval: (1) the effects of a secondary task on memory performance and (2) the 
effects of memory retrieval on the secondary task (called secondary task costs). The 
secondary task used in this study was a continuous reaction time (CRT) task, which 
consists of four boxes arranged horizontally on a computer screen. At random, an 
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asterisk appears in one of the four boxes and the participant indicates its location by 
pressing one of four keys. The response immediately starts the next trial, necessitating 
continuous responding. 
Craik et al. found that the CRT task retrieval produced little or no decline in 
memory accuracy compared to memory retrieval in isolation. Thus, the results of 
Baddelely et al. (1984) were replicated for tests of free-recall, cued-recall, and 
recognition. However, when the attention demands of retrieval were measured through 
secondary task costs, large and consistent effects were found. That is, the responses on 
the CRT were longer when that task was carried out in conjunction with memory 
retrieval than when carried out by itself (Craik et al., 1996; see Naveh-Benjamin et al., 
1998, for similar results). This is contrary to Baddeley et al.’s (1984) central claim that 
retrieval processes are automatic. The large secondary task costs imply that retrieval 
must require the use of attentional resources. 
Craik et al. (1996) concluded that unlike encoding processes, which are 
susceptible to the disruptive effects of dividing attention, retrieval processes are 
obligatory (or “protected”) and thus not hindered by dividing attention (Craik et al., 
1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000b). That is, they argued that although retrieval is 
attention-demanding, success of retrieval is unaffected by competition for central 
processing resources because it takes precedence over other ongoing activities. In further 
support of this, Craik et al. (1996) instructed some participants to emphasize the 
memory test, other participants to emphasize the CRT task, and others to emphasize 
both equally. They found that the type of instructions had no effect on memory 
performance. That is, participants performed equivalently on the memory test regardless 
of how they were told to allocate their attentional efforts. This indicates that the 
allocation of attention resources during retrieval is not under the participant’s control 
(Craik et al., 1996). This contrasts with the effects of dividing attention during encoding, 
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where the same attentional focus instructions produced graded memory performance 
(with instructions to focus on encoding leading to highest memory performance, 
instructions to focus on the secondary task producing worst performance, and 
instructions to emphasize both equally leading to intermediate performance). This 
implies that, unlike encoding processes, retrieval processes are not under the control of 
participants (i.e., they are obligatory). 
A recent study using positron emission tomography (PET) provides further 
evidence (Iidaka, Anderson, Kapur, Cabeza, & Craik, 2000; see also, Anderson et al., 
2000). The behavioral methodology of this study was similar to that of Craik et al. 
(1996). It was found that under FA, memory retrieval processes selectively activated 
specific regions of the brain (including the right pre-frontal cortex, the right anterior-
cingulate gyrus, and two areas in the right middle-frontal gyrus). Interestingly, DA did 
not reduce activation in these areas. These results seem consistent with the behavioral 
finding that dividing attention during retrieval had no effect on later memory 
performance and indicate that, even under DA, retrieval processes operate normally. 
This contrasts with the results from encoding where the secondary task reduced both 
memory performance and activation in brain regions selectively engaged by encoding 
processes. 
Returning to behavioral measures, studies prior to Baddeley et al. (1984) reveals 
a similar pattern of results with respect to dividing attention during memory retrieval 
(Johnston, Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, 1970; Johnston, Griffith, & Wagstaff, 1972; 
Johnston, Wagstaff, & Griffith, 1972; Martin, 1970; Martin & Kelly, 1974; Martin, 
Martson, & Kelly, 1973; Trumbo & Milone, 1971). All of these early examined secondary 
task costs to determine the attention requirements of the primary memory task (i.e., DA 
effects on memory retrieval were not measured). These studies, consistently found that 
memory retrieval produced large and robust secondary task costs, supporting the idea 
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that memory retrieval requires attentional resources (e.g., Johnston et al., 1970; Martin, 
1970; Trumbo & Milone, 1971). 
A number of studies have supported the notion that episodic retrieval is 
obligatory. This has been shown for tests of free- and cued-recall (Craik et al. 2000; 
Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000a; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 
2000b; Naveh-Benjamin & Guez, 2000) and for tests of recognition (Anderson et al., 
1998; Baddeley et al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996; Dodson, Holland, & Shimamura, 1998; 
Jones & Jacoby, 2001; Koustaal, Schacter, & Brenner, 2001; Troyer & Craik, 2000; 
Whiting & Smith, 1997). Despite this, other studies have found large, deleterious effects 
of DA on levels of recall (Carrier & Pashler, 1995; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000, 2002, 
2003; Gooding et al., 1999; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989; Rohrer & Pashler, 
2003) and recognition (Carrier & Pashler, 1995; Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Fernandes & 
Moscovitch, 2000; Gooding et al., 1999; Gruppuso et al. 1997; Hicks & Marsh, 2000; 
Jacoby, 1991; Lozito & Mulligan, 2006; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997), showing that, 
under certain circumstances, memory retrieval can be severely affected by dividing 
attention. 
Fernandes & Moscovitch (2000, 2002, 2003; Fernandes, Moscovitch, Zeigler, & 
Grady, 2005) argued that material-specific interference effects occur when the primary 
memory test and secondary task utilize the same type of materials (e.g, words) because 
both tasks will draw on the same domain-specific representational systems. In one study, 
Fernandes et al. (2005) had participants a recognition test for a list of previously 
presented words while simultaneously engaging in one of two secondary tasks: (1) an 
animacy task in which participants were presented with a series of words, half of which 
represented living objects and half of which represented non-living objects; participants 
responded whenever a word representing a non-living object was presented or (2) a digit 
monitoring task in which participants were presented with a series of numbers, half of 
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which were odd and half of which were even; participants had to respond whenever an 
odd digit was presented. The verbal secondary task severely impaired recognition 
memory. Critically, they found the numerical distracter task produced no memory 
interference (e.g., Fernandes et al., 2005). Fernandes and Moscovitch (2000, 2002, 
2003; Fernandes et al.) argued the similarity in materials between the retrieval and 
secondary tasks induces competition for use of a word-specific representational system, 
which resulted in decrements to memory retrieval. According to this analysis, prior 
studies (e.g., Craik et al., 1996) failed to obtain DA effects because the primary and 
secondary tasks used different materials (e.g., a verbal memory test paired with any 
number of non-verbal secondary tasks, such as the CRT task). Thus the retrieval and 
secondary tasks failed to compete for the same domain-specific representational system. 
 Hicks and Marsh (2000) highlighted a different issue. They argued that the type 
of retrieval in which participants engage is the critical determinant of whether or not 
memory retrieval will be affected by a concurrent task. Hicks and Marsh appealed to the 
dual-process model of recognition memory. This model proposes that memory retrieval 
consists of two independent processes, recollection and familiarity that act as alternative 
bases for making recognition memory decisions (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). 
Recollection is viewed as consciously remembering both the specific test item and the 
context in which it occurred whereas familiarity is described as a feeling that an item was 
previously encountered without a retrieval of contextual details. Importantly, 
recollection is assumed to be conscious, effortful, and heavily reliant on attention 
(Yonelinas, 2002). Hicks and Marsh hypothesized that retrieval driven by recollection, as 
opposed to familiarity, would be severely affected by dividing attention. To test this, 
Hicks and Marsh had participants encode items in one of two manners: reading intact 
words or generating words from anagrams. It has been previously shown that generating 
words during encoding produces more recollection during retrieval than does reading 
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(Gardiner, 1988). Hicks and Marsh found little effect of DA for memory in the read 
condition (a finding consistent with the results from Baddelely et al., 1984 and Craik et 
al., 1996). Importantly, they found retrieval of the generated items was greatly affected 
by a concurrent task. According to this analysis, prior studies found little or no DA effect 
because they used encoding conditions that failed to elicit recollective retrieval on the 
subsequent memory test. 
 In an extension of Hicks and Marsh’s (2000) study, Lozito and Mulligan (2006) 
had participants encode a series of word either semantically or phonetically through the 
use of orienting questions. Semantic questions asked participants about the category 
membership or synonymity of a word; phonetic questions asked participants about the 
sound of the word. Half of the words word encoded semantically and half phonetically. 
Further, half of the semantic and phonetic questions required a positive response (yes-
items) and half a negative response (no-items). It was found that DA affected retrieval of 
items in the semantic and phonetic conditions equally. Interestingly, DA affected yes-
items but not no-items. Craik and Tulving (1975) noted differences between yes- and no-
items that help explain the results: “…it does not seem intuitively reasonable that words 
associated with yes responses require deeper processing before the decision is made. 
However, if high levels of retention are associated with “rich” or “elaborate” encodings of 
the words (rather than deep encoding), the differences in retention between positive and 
negative words becomes understandable.” [italics in original] (Craik & Tulving, 1975, p. 
281). Under this view, the yes questions facilitate the integration of the studied word and 
its encoding (question) context into a coherent memory trace, which can assist 
recognition accuracy. During the test, a yes-item might lead to a retrieval of the question, 
which would be positive evidence of “oldness.” No-items, however, are less likely to lead 
to question retrieval (Craik & Tulving, 1975; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Such 
retrieval of contextual information is typically conceived of as recollection (e.g., 
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Yonelinas, 2002). Consequently, the present results and analysis are an extension of 
Hicks and Marsh’s (2000) general claim that conditions promoting recollection produce 
retrieval susceptible to dividing attention. 
 Rohrer & Pashler (2003) argued that many prior studies on DA and retrieval 
used insufficiently demanding secondary tasks, which failed to produce deleterious 
effects of the task on memory retrieval (see also, Hicks & Marsh, 2000, for a similar 
argument). Specifically, they argued that the CRT task used in many prior studies (e.g., 
Craik et al., 1996) suffered from two limitations. Firstly, it was self-paced, which would 
allow participants to “cheat” by alternating between the primary and secondary task (i.e., 
purposely responding to this task in between memory retrievals rather than during 
memory retrievals). Secondly, the CRT task has highly compatible response mapping 
(i.e., if the asterisk appeared in the right-most box, participants pressed the right-most 
button), rendering this task easier. In response to this, Rohrer and Pashler utilized a 
secondary task that was not self-paced and for which the response mappings were not 
compatible. Their secondary task consisted of a serial-choice-reaction task in which 
participants responded to stimuli that appeared at a fixed presentation rate. Each 
stimulus was either a red, blue, or green square that appeared on a computer screen for a 
fixed duration. Participants used the keyboard and pressed the appropriate key for each 
color square (B for red, N for green, and M for blue). They found that their secondary 
task greatly reduced free recall performance, supporting the idea that, given a sufficiently 
demanding secondary task, any type of memory test can be disrupted by a concurrent 
task. 
 A good deal of recent research has explored the role of attention during memory 
retrieval. One limitation is that nearly all of the extant research in this area has focused 
on conscious, explicit memory. Almost no research has focused on the role of attention 
during unconscious, implicit retrieval.
  
 
 
CHAPTER III 
IMPLICIT MEMORY 
 
 Memories can be retrieved either explicitly or implicitly. In traditional explicit 
memory tests, participants are required to consciously think back and intentionally 
retrieve information about prior events (usually experimenter provided). Explicit 
memory is typically measured by tests that make specific reference to the prior events, 
such as recall or recognition. These may be contrasted with implicit memory tests, which 
assess unintentional, or incidental, influences of memory. Implicit memory is inferred by 
changes in performance such as increased speed or accuracy in responding to a recently-
experienced stimulus relative to a baseline condition. Examples of implicit tests include 
word-stem and word-fragment completion tasks. In these tasks, participants are initially 
presented with a series of words (e.g., table). During a later test phase, participants are 
presented with a series of word stems (e.g., tab__) or word fragments (e.g., t_b_e) and 
are asked to complete each with the first appropriate word that comes to mind (e.g., 
‘table’). Some of the stems or fragments can be completed with studied (old) words and 
others can be completed with counterbalanced new words. Implicit memory is measured 
by subtracting the probability of successfully completing the new fragments from the 
probability of successfully completing the old fragments. Thus, the resulting number 
represents the degree to which prior exposure to the words benefited participants on the 
old fragments. Importantly, implicit tests make no mention of the relationship of the test 
to the prior study episodes. Facilitation on these tests can occur without conscious 
recollection of the study episode (see Schacter, 1987, for a review). 
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Dissociations between Implicit and Explicit Tests 
 The distinction between implicit and explicit retrieval is supported by converging 
evidence from neuropsychological, neuroscientific, aging, clinical, and pharmacological 
research. Such research has demonstrated consistent dissociations between implicit and 
explicit retrieval, with certain populations or conditions experiencing deficits to one type 
of retrieval, with relative sparing of the other. I will next describe population and 
pharmacological dissociations that underscore fundamental differences between implicit 
and explicit types of retrieval. 
 Warrington and Weiskrantz (1968, 1970, 1974, 1978) provided the first examples 
of a dissociation between implicit and explicit memory. In one study, Warrington & 
Weiskrantz (1970) examined memory for words in patients with anterograde amnesia 
and normal controls using three types of retrieval tasks: free recall, recognition, and 
word-fragment completion. Compared to healthy controls, amnesic patients consistently 
showed deficits to explicit memory (recall and recognition), with near-normal levels of 
priming (word-fragment completion). A similar pattern of results has been shown using 
a variety of other implicit tasks (e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Graf, 
Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Moscovitch, 1982; Shimamura, 1986; for a review, see 
Schacter, 1987). 
 The effects of age reveal a similar dissociation between implicit and explicit 
memory. When healthy younger and older adults are compared, older adults are typically 
impaired on explicit tests (see Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & Goossens, 1993, for a review). On 
implicit tests, however, younger and older adults typically show equivalent levels of 
priming (e.g., Light & Singh, 1987; for reviews, see Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998; Craik, 
Anderson, Kerr, & Li, 1995; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 1999). Light and Singh, presented 
younger and older adults with a series of words and explored age differences in implicit 
memory (with tests of word-stem completion and perceptual identification) and explicit 
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memory (free recall, cued recall, and recognition). They found that older adults had 
consistently lower levels of explicit memory on all tests, with no deficit in any of the 
implicit tests. People with schizophrenia (Danion, Meulmans, Kauffman-Muller, 
Vermaat, 2001; Gras-Vincendon et al., 1994) and with depression (Bazin, Perruchet, de 
Bonis, & Féline, 1994) show similar patterns of implicit and explicit memory 
performance compared to healthy controls. 
 Pharmacological studies also support the implicit—explicit distinction. 
Benzodiazepines (including triazolam, diazepam, and midazolam) are central nervous 
system depressants used in anesthesia and to treat anxiety. These drugs also produce a 
powerful but temporary form of anterograde amnesia, in which memory for information 
encountered after administration of the drug is poor. Research has shown that such 
adverse effects on memory are largely restricted to explicit memory with relatively 
unaffected levels of priming1 (Danion, Zimmerman, Willard-Schroeder, Grangé, & 
Ghoneim, 1989; Hirshman, Passanante, & Arndt, 1999a; Hirshman, Passanante, & 
Arndt, 2001; Hirshman, Passanante, & Henzler, 1999b; Polster, McCarthy, O’Sullican, 
Gray, & Gilbert, 1993; Weingartner, Hommer, Lister, Thompson, & Wolkowitz, 1992; see 
Curran, 2000, for a review). Hirshman et al. (1999b) induced amnesia in participants 
using midazolam. Each participant participated in two sessions (one under the influence 
of midazolam and the other with a saline control). Participants initially studied a series 
of visually presented words. The test phase began 50 minutes after the study phase to 
ensure that participants were no longer under the influences of the midazolam. During 
the test phase, participants engaged in two implicit tests (perceptual identification and 
                                                 
1 A (relative) sparing of implicit memory, compared with concomitant disruption to 
explicit memory, has been demonstrated across many studies using a variety of 
benzodiazepines. However, it has been found that one benzodiazepine, namely 
Lorazepam consistently reduces memory performance across explicit and implicit 
memory tests (e.g., Brown, Brown, & Bowes, 1989; Danion et al., 1999; Sellal et al., 1992; 
Vidaihet, Kazès, Danion, Kauffmann-Muller, & Grangé, 1996; Vidailhet, Danion, 
Chemin, Kazès, 1999). 
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word-fragment completion) and one explicit test (free recall). Relative sparing of implicit 
memory was found. That is, the midazolam-induced amnesia was disproportionately 
larger for explicit memory (see also Polster et al., 1993, for similar results). Thus, the 
benzodiazepine-induced amnesia produces a similar dissociation between implicit and 
explicit memory as that caused by organic amnesia. 
 All such studies demonstrate single dissociations. That is, a dissociation in which 
a population shows a deficit in explicit memory, with no effect on implicit memory. Even 
more compelling evidence for the implicit—explicit distinction would be a double 
dissociation. In other words, a dissociation in which two distinct populations (i.e., 
patients with damage to different parts of the brain) exhibit opposite patterns of implicit 
and explicit performance. One study demonstrated such a double dissociation between 
implicit and explicit retrieval (Gabrieli, Fleischman, Keane, Reminger, & Morrell, 1995). 
Gabrieli et al. gave a series of explicit (recognition and cued-recall) and implicit 
(perceptual identification, word-stem completion, and category exemplar production) 
tests to a patient, M. S., who has a lesion to the right occipital lobe. Gabrieli et al. found 
that M. S. had intact explicit memory and impaired implicit memory across all 
administered tests. This contrasts to the dissociations described above, in which amnesic 
patients with medial temporal lobe damage showed the opposite dissociation. These 
dissociations provide striking evidence in favor of a distinction between implicit and 
explicit types of retrieval. 
 All of the above research has demonstrated population dissociations between 
implicit and explicit memory. A study by Jacoby (1983) further supports this distinction 
by demonstrating a functional dissociation between implicit and explicit memory. 
During the learning phase, participants studied words in one of three conditions. In the 
no-context condition, participants read words that were presented with a preceding 
neutral stimulus (e.g., xxx—cold). In the context condition, participants read words 
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presented with a preceding antonym (e.g., hot—cold). In the generate condition, 
participants generated target words from antonym cues and the first letter of the target 
word (e.g., hot—c, for cold). During retrieval, participants engaged in either a perceptual 
identification or recognition test. The results for the recognition test replicated the 
traditional generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978), with generated items producing 
the greatest recognition accuracy, followed by the context condition, with the no-context 
condition producing the lowest accuracy. Interestingly, performance on the perceptual 
identification task produced the exact opposite pattern. Thus a generation manipulation 
also dissociates performance on these implicit and explicit tests. 
Dissociations between Perceptual and Conceptual Tests 
 Implicit (and explicit) retrieval is further dissociable into perceptual and 
conceptual forms, here referred to as the perceptual—conceptual hypothesis. Perceptual 
priming reflects implicit memory for stimulus form and is sensitive to changes in 
perceptual (e.g., visual or auditory) information. Because of this, perceptual implicit tests 
emphasize form attributes of the stimulus. One example of a perceptual implicit test 
would be a word-stem completion task in which participants are presented with a word 
stem (e.g., sto__) and are asked to complete the stem with the first word that comes to 
mind. Such a task places heavy reliance on visual information about the word. Because 
perceptual tests reflect visual or auditory information about a stimulus, such tests are 
sensitive to changes in study—test form (i.e., changes between study and test items in 
visual or auditory information). For example, priming in word-stem completion is lower 
when study words were presented aurally than when they were presented visually (e.g., 
Gabrieli, Fleicshman, Keane, Reminger, & Morrell, 1995; Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 
1985). Further, participants are faster to name pictures at test (i.e., a picture naming 
task) when they were presented with pictures at study than when they were presented 
with picture names (e.g., Brown, Neblett, Jones, & Mitchell, 1991; Park & Gabrieli, 1995). 
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Further, perceptual priming shows a reverse generation effect, with reading words 
producing more perceptual priming than generating words (e.g., Jacoby, 1983). 
Generally, perceptual priming is enhanced by emphasizing perceptual encoding of a 
stimulus and is decreased by a disruption to or change in perceptual information. 
 Conceptual priming reflects implicit memory for stimulus meaning. Thus, 
conceptual implicit tests emphasize semantic attributes of the stimulus. One example is 
category exemplar production in which participants are presented with category names 
(e.g., furniture) and are asked to quickly generate exemplars from each category. 
Priming is inferred when previously-studied examples are more likely to be produced 
than baseline examples. Priming in such a test is heavily reliant on conceptual (semantic) 
information about the word. Conceptual implicit tests are therefore sensitive to encoding 
manipulations than emphasize semantic features of stimuli. Having participants think 
about the meaning of the words during the study phase has been shown to enhance later 
conceptual priming more than having participants think about the form of words (i.e., 
conceptual tests show a levels-of-processing effect; e.g., Mulligan, Guyer, & Belland, 
1999). This contrasts with perceptual priming, which show no levels-of-processing 
effects. Finally, changes in study—test form (e.g., modality manipulations) do no affect 
conceptual priming, again contrasting with perceptual tests. 
 Much research has supported the distinction between perceptual and conceptual 
types of processing (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby, 1983; for reviews, see Roediger, 1990; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). In revisiting the 
Jacoby (1983) study, it has been since argued that the recognition test relies more 
heavily on conceptual processing and the perceptual identification task relies more 
heavily on perceptual processing. Thus the two memory tests differ along implicit—
explicit and perceptual—conceptual lines. This functional dissociation between implicit 
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and explicit types of retrieval can therefore also be interpreted in terms of a distinction 
between perceptual and conceptual retrieval tasks. 
 Blaxton (1989) elaborated on the Jacoby (1983) study by further demonstrating a 
separation of implicit (and explicit) retrieval into perceptual and conceptual types. 
Blaxton included four types of memory tests: (1) word-fragment completion (an 
implicit—perceptual test); (2) general knowledge questions, some of whose answers were 
presented at study (an implicit—conceptual test); (3) graphemic cued recall in which 
participants were presented with words that were visually similar to studied words and 
were asked to use the visual cue to recall the study word (an explicit—perceptual test); 
and (4) free recall and semantic cued recall in which participants were presented with 
words that were semantically related to prior studied words and were asked to use the 
semantic cue to recall the study word (both are explicit—conceptual tests). Thus, Blaxton 
expanded upon the Jacoby study by including implicit-conceptual and explicit-
perceptual types of tests. The study phase was identical to Jacoby’s study. Blaxton 
replicated the results from Jacoby’s study with explicit—conceptual tests exhibiting a 
generation effect and implicit—perceptual tests exhibiting a reverse generation effect. In 
addition, the no-context condition enhanced memory on the explicit—perceptual tests 
and the generate condition enhanced priming for the implicit—conceptual tests. As a 
result, such a finding shows a clear dissociation between perceptual and conceptual types 
of implicit (and explicit) retrieval with generation enhancing performance across all 
conceptual tests and reading (with no context) enhancing performance across all 
perceptual tests. 
 A further manipulation that dissociates these two types of tests is dividing 
attention during the study portion. This has been consistently shown to significantly 
reduce levels of conceptual priming across a multitude of conceptual implicit tests (e.g., 
Gabrieli et al., 1999; Mulligan, 1997, 1998; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996). Perceptual 
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priming is less likely to be disrupted by the same DA manipulations (e.g., Mulligan, 
2003, Experiment 2; Mulligan & Hornstein, 2000; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; Parkin & 
Russo, 1990; Russo & Parkin, 1993 cf. Mulligan, 2003, Experiment 1; Light & Prull, 
1995). Thus, dividing attention during study appears to affect perceptual and conceptual 
tests differently. 
 The functional dissociations between perceptual and conceptual priming may 
reflect corresponding anatomical dissociations in neural systems that underlie these two 
types of priming tasks (for a review, see Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000). 
Converging evidence from neuropsychological and neuroscientific research indicates 
that perceptual priming is supported by activity in modality-specific regions of the brain. 
For example, visual priming is linked to visual areas of the occipital lobes, with neural 
activity in extrastriate cortex heavily linked to visual priming (Blaxton et al., 1996; 
Buckner et al., 1995; Fleischman et al., 1995; Gabrieli et al., 1995; for a review, see 
Schacter et al., 2000). Conceptual priming, on the other hand, is supported by activation 
in left frontal and temporal-parietal brain regions (Blaxton et al., 1996; Gabrieli et al., 
1996; Demb et al., 1995). Along similar lines, Schacter and his colleagues (e.g., Schacter 
et al., 2000) have proposed that perceptual priming is supported by the perceptual 
representation system (PRS), a memory system that processes information about the 
structure and form of objects, prior to analysis of their semantic content. Presumably, 
conceptual priming is primarily driven by activation of representations within the 
semantic memory system (Schacter et al., 2000). Because dissociations between these 
two proposed systems of memory have been observed using brain imaging techniques 
(e.g., Blaxton et al., 1996), it may provide further evidence of a neurological, as well as 
functional, dissociation between perceptual and conceptual types of priming. 
Dissociations between Identification and Production Tests 
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 A more recent distinction between types of implicit tests was motivated by 
research on patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Initial studies of AD seemed to 
support the implicit—explicit and the perceptual—conceptual distinction. Similar to 
amnesic patients, AD patients show impairment to explicit memory (recall and 
recognition), while exhibiting intact perceptual priming (e.g., a word identification task; 
Abbenhuis, Raajmakers, Raajmakers, & Van Woerden, 1990; Fleischman et al., 1995; 
Fleischman et al., 2001; Keane, Gabrieli, Fennema, Growdon, & Corkin, 1991; Russo & 
Spinler, 1994; for a review, see Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998). Unlike amnesic patients, 
however, AD patients show reduced priming on conceptual tests (e.g., word-association 
and category-exemplar production; Brandt, Spencer, McSorely, & Flostein, 1988; 
Carlesimo, Fadda, Marfia, & Caltagirone, 1995; Monti et al., 1996; Vaidya, Gabrieli, 
Monti, Tinklenberg, & Yesavage, 1999; for a review, see Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998). 
Thus AD patients show an additional dissociation that amnesic patients do now show: 
intact perceptual priming and impaired conceptual priming. 
 However, AD patients show an additional deficit that fails to map onto either the 
implicit—explicit distinction or the perceptual—conceptual distinction. Namely, AD 
patients display a significant impairment in word-stem completion priming (Fleischman 
et al., 2001; Gabrieli et al., 1994; Gabrieli et al., 1999; Keane et al., 1991; Salmon, 
Shimamura, Butters, & Smith, 1988; Shimamura, Salmon, Squire, & Butters, 1987). Such 
an impairment cannot be explained by a deficit to explicit memory, nor to a deficit in 
conceptual priming. This task therefore represents an implicit—perceptual task that is 
impaired among AD patients. 
 In response to this additional deficit, Gabrieli et al. (1999; Fleischman et al., 
2001; Prull, 2004) introduced a further distinction between implicit tasks to account for 
the data from AD patients, here referred to as the identification—production hypothesis. 
According to this distinction, implicit tests are classified as tests that involve stimulus 
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identification or that involve stimulus production. Identification priming tasks instruct 
participants to identify a test stimulus (e.g., What is this word? table) or verify an 
attribute of the stimulus (e.g., Is table a type of furniture: yes or no?; Is table living or 
nonliving?). Identification tests can involve the analysis of either the form or the 
meaning of a stimulus. Stimuli may be presented normally, or in degraded form. In all 
cases, participants are asked to identify the stimulus, or some feature of the stimulus. 
One example of this kind of task would be a category verification test in which 
participants are presented with a word (e.g., table) and are asked to verify whether or not 
it comes from a specific category (e.g., furniture). Other identification tasks include word 
or picture naming, lexical decision, semantic verification, semantic classification, and 
single-response word-fragment tests. Critically, identification tests have in common a 
search process for which there is only one correct answer, implying that retrieval cues 
map onto, or activates, only a single representation in memory. That is, search processes 
ultimately converge upon a single response or representation. As a result, Gabrieli et al. 
argued that these tasks rely on convergent search processes (see also, Prull, 2004). 
 Other kinds of implicit tasks cannot be achieved by identifying, verifying, or 
classifying a stimulus. Rather participants use a cue in an open-ended manner to 
generate many correct responses. These kinds of implicit tasks are called production 
priming tasks. An example of this kind of task would be a word-stem completion task in 
which participants are presented with a word stem (e.g., sto__) that matches many 
legitimate completions (e.g., store, stone, stole, storm, etc.), and are asked to complete 
the stem with the first word that comes to mind. Other production tasks include: 
category-exemplar production, multiple-response word-fragment completion, and word 
association. Critically, for production tests, there are many possible answers, implying 
that test cues map onto (or activates) many potential responses. Because many potential 
responses are activated by test cues, Gabrieli et al. argued that these kinds of tasks 
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involve divergent search processes. Such search processes are purported to require the 
selection of one response from an array potential responses that are activated by the 
presented cue (see also, Prull, 2004). 
 The identification—production distinction is empirically supported by 
dissociations across several behavioral and neuropsychological studies. For example, 
production priming tasks have been shown to be more adversely affected by study phase 
division of attention (Gabrieli et al., 1999, Experiment 2). In this experiment, half of the 
participants studied either picture or words (the names of the pictures) in isolation; the 
other half of participants studied the same pictures or words while maintaining a 
concurrent memory load. The identification priming task was a picture naming task and 
the production priming task was a word stem completion task (all participants who 
studied pictures performed the identification task and all participants who studied words 
performed the production task). Gabrieli et al. indeed found that study phase division of 
attention affected word stem completion but not picture naming. 
 Neuropsychologically, it has been demonstrated that people with Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD) show disrupted production priming and near-normal identification priming 
(e.g., Fleischman et al., 2001; Gabrieli et al., 1999; see Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998, for a 
review). For example, relative to healthy controls, people with AD demonstrated reduced 
priming on word-stem completion but normal priming in word naming (Fleischmman et 
al.; Gabrieli et al.). Furthermore, people with AD were impaired on category exemplar 
production but had normal levels of priming in category-exemplar verification (Gabrieli 
et al., Experiment 3). Thus, the identification—production distinction fits the pattern of 
implicit performance among AD patients and highlights why they show impairment in 
word-stem completion: it is a production task, on which they are generally impaired. 
 It has been argued that one further distinction between identification and 
production tasks lies in attentional demand during retrieval (Fleischman et al., 2001). 
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Specifically, production tests require the selection of a response from an array of 
potential responses, producing response competition. Identification tests activate only a 
single representation, eliminating response competition. This increased response 
competition is purported to induce heavier attentional load for production tests relative 
to identification tasks during retrieval. Evidence in favor of this comes from brain 
imaging studies (e.g., Desmond, Gabrieli, & Glover, 1998; Thompson-Shill, D’Esposito, 
Aguirre, & Farah, 1997), which have shown that left frontal lobe activation increases 
systematically with increases in response competition in production tasks. Prior 
researchers have posited that tasks that heavily activate frontal areas will be most 
susceptible to dividing attention (e.g., Moscovitch, 1994). Because response competition 
is minimized for identification tasks (because the search processes converge upon a 
single response), these tasks may involve less left frontal brain activation and less 
allocation of attentional resources. Thus this analysis also indicates that production tests 
should be more affected by dividing attention than identification tests. As noted earlier, 
Gabrieli et al. (1999) demonstrated that dividing attention during study affected 
production tasks more than identification tasks. However, given that this distinction 
emphasizes differences in the processing requirements (including attentional 
requirements) of the test, this makes the clear prediction that dividing participants’ 
attention during the test phase should more adversely affect production tasks than 
identification tasks. Because attentional manipulations have only been implemented 
during the study phase, the identification—production distinction has yet to be fully 
evaluated in this regard.
  
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
ADDITIONAL THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL WORK 
 
Automatic Implicit Retrieval 
 Dual-process models of memory retrieval distinguish between recollection and 
familiarity, arguing that both contribute to memory retrieval (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 
2002). Recollection is assumed to be conscious and attention-demanding; whereas 
familiarity is assumed to be automatic. Furthermore, in this model, familiarity is 
assumed to rely on the same mechanisms that produce priming on implicit tests (e.g., 
Jacoby, 1991). Thus, the dual-process model argues that familiarity, and by extension 
implicit memory retrieval, is automatic. In fact, some researchers have made the specific 
claim that implicit memory retrieval processes, relative to explicit memory retrieval, are 
unconscious and therefore automatic (e.g., Gooding et al., 1999; Jacoby, 1991; 
Moscovitch, 1992), here termed the automaticity hypothesis. To date, most studies have 
focused on the role of automatic and controlled processing in explicit retrieval tasks such 
as recognition, with very few studies investigating such processing in implicit retrieval. 
 Further, Logan (1990) argues that both repetition priming and automaticity 
result from a common underlying mechanism – namely, the storage and retrieval of 
representations of individual exposures to specific items. In other words, in repetition 
priming tasks, old items are experienced for the second time, whereas new items are 
experienced for the first time (within the context of the experiment). Thus, Logan argues 
that this second exposure to the item decreases the attentional demands of processing 
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the item and the improvements in performance found for old items relative to new items 
is the result of the increased automaticity of processing these items. 
 Neuroimaging research suggests that the priming component of implicit tests 
reflect decreases in brain activation (e.g., Blaxton et al., 1996; see Henson, 2005, for a 
review). Blaxton et al. (1996) contrasted a conceptual (semantic association) and 
perceptual (word-fragment completion) implicit test. They found that the semantic 
association task generally activated medial and lateral left hemisphere in frontal and 
temporal regions. Word-fragment completion, in contrast, produced greater activation in 
right frontal and temporal cortex as well as bilateral activation in more posterior regions. 
For semantic association, comparisons of the old trials with new trials (control) revealed 
memory-specific deactivations in left medial and superior temporal cortex as well as left 
frontal cortex. Memory-specific deactivations for word-fragment completion were 
localized in more posterior regions including occipital cortex. These patterns of 
deactivation imply diminished processing demands old items relative to new items. 
 The component process model proposed by Moscovitch (1992) is also relevant to 
the present study. According to this model, memory performance across a variety of 
types of tests is mediated by four components: (1) a nonfrontal neocortical component, 
(2) a modular medial temporal/hippocampal component, (3) a frontal-lobe central 
system, and (4) a basal ganglia component. Critically, it is proposed that the frontal-lobe 
central system is involved in strategic, effortful processing at encoding and retrieval; 
whereas the other components process information manditorily and automatically. Thus, 
relative to tasks that involve central systems, tasks that are mediated by modules require 
few attentional resources for their operation and should not be disrupted by a concurrent 
task (e.g., Moscovitch, 1994). Originally, Moscovitch (1992) proposed that implicit 
memory retrieval is mediated by the nonfrontal, neocortical component. Thus, the 
original version of this model predicted that implicit memory retrieval should generally 
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be automatic and unaffected by a concurrent task during retrieval. Later research 
indicated that conceptual priming was driven by activation in frontal areas of the brain. 
Thus this analysis suggests that conceptual priming, driven by the frontal component, 
will be sensitive to dual-task demands; perceptual priming, on the other hand, will not 
be. 
The Role of Environmental Support 
 One additional theoretical framework is relevant to my inquiry. This framework, 
developed by Craik (1986; Craik & Byrd, 1982), posits that retrieval tasks vary in the 
degree to which they require self-initiated cognitive operations. That is, certain retrieval 
tasks provide little environmental support (e.g., test cues), increasing the need for 
participants to reconstruct the original encoding event (e.g., retrieve the study context) 
to successfully retrieve information. Other tests, however, provide greater amounts of 
environmental test support, diminishing the need for self-initiated processing. 
 For example, Craik (1986) argues that free recall, for which participants are given 
no overt cues and thus little environmental support requires the heaviest use of self-
initiated processing. Recognition, which re-presents the actual study stimuli, requires 
much less self-initiated processing. Cued recall, for which participants have to recall an 
item based on a test cue, falls between free recall and recognition in terms of need for 
self-initiated processes and amount of environmental support. This implies a continuum 
which distinguishes memory tests in terms of reliance upon self-initiated processing. 
 Craik has adduced support for this framework from research on age differences 
in memory. Craik posits that aging is accompanied by a concomitant reduction in 
attentional resources. He further argues that those tasks that require the heaviest use of 
self-initiated processes are most attention-demanding and therefore should show the 
largest age-related deficits in memory performance. In support of this, older adults 
typically show memory deficits largest for free recall, smallest for recognition, and 
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intermediate for cued-recall (for reviews, see Craik, 1986; Craik & Byrd, 1982; see 
Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & Goossens, 1993 for a meta-analysis). For present purposes, this 
continuum is relevant in terms of the attention demand of different tests. That is, free 
recall would be most attention-demanding, recognition least attention-demanding, with 
cued-recall intermediate. Further support for this comes from studies that have shown 
that DA effects are largest for free recall, followed by cued-recall, with recognition 
performance least affected (e.g., Craik et al., 1996). 
 Because implicit retrieval is posited by some to be more automatic (the 
automaticity hypothesis), on the above continuum, implicit memory tests should 
generally be less reliant upon self-initiated processing (see Craik, 1986, for a similar 
argument). Thus, these tests should generally be less attention-demanding than explicit 
tests. Furthermore, identification priming should be less attention-demanding than 
production priming. For identification tests, participants are typically presented with 
original study stimulus and are asked to identify it or verify some aspect of it. For 
production tests, participants are typically presented with a test cue and are forced to 
generate a well-known response to it. This is accompanied by an active selection of a 
response from an array of potential responses. Thus, identification tasks provide more 
environmental support (i.e., re-presentation of the actual study item), whereas 
production tasks appear to require more use of self-initiated processing (i.e., active 
response selection). As a result, this framework implies that production tasks are more 
attention-demanding than identification tests, and should be more affected by dividing 
attention. In sum, the full continuum suggests (in terms of attentional engagement): free 
recall > cued recall > recognition > production priming > identification priming. 
Prior Empirical Findings 
 One study provides evidence that implicit retrieval processes are largely 
automatic, supporting one of the predictions of the automaticity hypothesis (Gooding et 
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al., 1999). In this study, participants were presented with sentences that contained cue 
and target words. Participants were told to read the sentences and rate the degree to 
which the sentence linked the cue and target words. The cue and target words were 
presented in all capital letters in red font (all other words were presented in lowercase 
letters in black font). Participants were not told to remember either the cue or target 
words or of the upcoming memory tests. During the test phase, participants took three 
memory tests: word-stem completion, cued-recall, and recognition. For the word-stem 
completion task, participants were presented with cue word—word stem pairs (e.g., 
dove—sti__), some of which corresponded to cue and target words that were presented 
in earlier sentences. The pairs presented during this test fell into one of three categories: 
same paired (where the cue word and word stem represented a pair that was presented 
together in an earlier sentence), re-paired (where the cue word and the word stem were 
each presented earlier, but in different sentences), or new (where a new word stem was 
paired with a previously presented cue word). Because both the same paired and re-
paired conditions involved old word stems, priming was measured with regard to each of 
these conditions. For this task, priming was defined as the proportion of correct stem 
completions for each “old” condition minus the proportion correct for the “new” 
condition. The word-stem task was either done either alone or with a concurrent task. 
The secondary task consisted of presentation of a series of 3-4 digits, which the 
participants were asked to sum. The set of 3-4 digits was presented concurrently with 
each cue-stem pair. Consistent with the automaticity hypothesis, it was found that the 
concurrent task failed to disrupt the level of priming for either “old” condition (Gooding 
et al., 1999), despite a significant DA effect for cued-recall and recognition. 
 A further study provides additional insight. In this study, Helman and Berry 
(2003) created an artificial grammar (AG), which defined particular sequences of letters 
as either acceptable or unacceptable examples of the AG. During the study phase of this 
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experiment, participants were presented with a series of strings of letters, each of which 
conformed to the AG. Participants were not told of the AG, only that they would be 
presented with a series of random letters. As a result, learning of the AG was incidental. 
During a later test phase, half of the participants were placed in an implicit group and 
the other half in an explicit group. Participants in both groups were told that they would 
be presented with more strings of letters and to rate how much they liked each string 
(using a 6-point scale). All strings during this portion of the experiment were new (i.e., 
they were not the same as any string presented earlier) and either did or did not conform 
to the AG. Participants in the implicit group were told to rate their liking of the new 
strings on a “gut feeling” or “first impression”; participants in the explicit group were 
told to rate their liking on how similar the new strings were to the ones presented earlier. 
Further, half of the participants in each group did only the liking ratings task, whereas 
the other half in each group performed the liking ratings task while concurrently 
engaging in a verbal random number generation task. 
 For the explicit group, it was found that in the FA condition, strings of letters that 
conformed to the AG were rated higher than those that did not (demonstrating explicit 
memory of the AG sequences). Under DA, however, liking ratings were no different for 
stings that conformed and those that did not (thus, DA reduced explicit memory). For 
the implicit group, it was found that in the FA condition, strings that conformed to the 
AG were rated higher than those that did not (demonstrating implicit memory of the AG 
sequences). Importantly, dividing attention had no effect on implicit liking ratings. That 
is, participants still rated those that conformed to the AG higher than those that did not, 
providing further evidence in favor of the automatic nature of implicit retrieval. The 
present study will extend such prior research and provide a more complete analysis of 
the role of attention during implicit retrieval, with respect to a variety of theoretical 
issues.
  
 
 
CHAPTER V 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
 The present study has four goals. The first goal is to generally assess the effect of 
dividing attention during implicit memory retrieval. The second goal is to test whether 
conceptual or perceptual types of implicit tests will be affected by a concurrent task. The 
third goal is to determine whether identification or production types of implicit tests will 
be affected by DA. The final goal is to determine the role of the concurrent task is 
obtaining DA effects. Each of these goals is discussed in turn. 
 First, some prior research has indicated that implicit retrieval is automatic (the 
automaticity hypothesis; e.g., Gooding et al., 1999). According to this notion, implicit 
memory should generally be unaffected by dividing attention during retrieval. In support 
of this, one study has indeed shown that implicit retrieval is unaffected by dividing 
attention (Gooding et al.). Further research similarly implies that implicit memory is 
automatic. Jacoby (1991) has equated explicit retrieval to recollection and implicit 
retrieval to familiarity. Recollection is assumed to be slow, conscious, and attention-
demanding; whereas familiarity is assumed to be fast, unconscious, and automatic. In 
support of this, Hicks and Marsh (2000) found that retrieval driven by recollection was 
more affected by dividing attention than retrieval driven by familiarity. This analysis 
implies that familiarity-driven and, critically, implicit retrieval should be relatively 
unaffected by a concurrent task (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). Other research 
suggests that any kind of retrieval can be affected by DA, given a sufficiently demanding 
secondary task (Rohrer & Pashler, 2003). Thus one goal of this research is to determine 
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whether or not implicit memory retrieval is generally affected by a concurrent task. This 
study will extend that research by testing effects of dividing attention across a variety of 
implicit tests. Other theories predict that specific types of implicit tests that should be 
affected by dividing attention, which will be briefly summarized next. 
 Second, I will explore whether perceptual or conceptual tests are affected by DA 
than perceptual tests. Given the extensive differences between conceptual and perceptual 
priming, a thorough analysis of attention and implicit retrieval demands inclusion of this 
variable. Furthermore there are empirical and theoretical reasons why the perceptual—
conceptual hypothesis predicts DA effects on conceptual, but not perceptual, priming. 
Specifically, conceptual implicit memory is more consistently affected by dividing 
attention during encoding, which indicates that conceptual implicit memory may be 
more reliant on controlled processing (for a review, see Mulligan & Brown, 2003). 
Further, conceptual implicit tests engage frontal areas of the brain (e.g., Blaxton et al., 
1996), whereas perceptual implicit tests engage modality-specific areas of the brain (e.g., 
Gabrieli et al., 1995). Prior research has argued that tasks heavily-reliant on frontal-lobes 
are more susceptible to disruption from a concurrent task (Moscovitch, 1992, 1994). If 
this is correct and frontal lobe involvement is critical in obtaining DA effects, this yields 
the prediction that dividing attention should disrupt conceptual priming but not 
perceptual priming. 
 Third, I will explore whether identification or production tests are affected by DA. 
According to the identification—production hypothesis, one difference between 
production and identification implicit tests is response competition. Specifically, 
production tests produce more response competition than identification tests. Resolving 
this response competition (i.e., choosing a single response from the activated array) is 
assumed to be attention-demanding (Fleischman et al., 2001). Support from this comes 
from the fact that as response competition of a task increases, so does frontal lobe 
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activation. As stated above, tasks that are heavily-reliant on frontal-lobes are more 
susceptible to disruption from a concurrent task (Moscovitch, 1992, 1994). Thus the 
identification—production hypothesis asserts that production tests are more reliant on 
attentional resources than identification tests (Fleischman et al., 2001) and DA should 
disrupt production priming but not identification priming. 
 These two considerations dictate a 2 (perceptual—conceptual) × 2 
(identification—production) array of implicit tests. Thus, the present study will use of 
four types of implicit tests: perceptual identification, word-stem completion, category 
verification, and category exemplar production. Perceptual tests include perceptual 
identification and word-stem completion; conceptual tests include category verification 
and category exemplar production. Identification tests include perceptual identification 
and category verification; production tests include word-stem completion and category 
exemplar production. 
 Fourth, I will assess the role of the concurrent task used to divide attention. In 
the domain of explicit memory, an important issue is the specific characteristics of 
concurrent tasks that produce DA effects (e.g., Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000; Hicks & 
Marsh, 2000; Rohrer & Pashler, 2003). Specifically, some researchers have argued that 
DA effects are most likely when the materials in the memory test and concurrent task 
match, producing competition for access to a material-specific representational system 
(e.g., Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000). Others have argued that such effects arise because 
of competition for general, non-specific, resources (Hicks & Marsh, 2000; Rohrer & 
Pashler, 2003). Hicks and Marsh, for example, found that multiple types of secondary 
tasks (e.g., digit load, number generation, letter generation, and serial addition) 
produced large DA effects, none of which used materials that matched the word-based 
memory tests. Thus it remains unclear whether DA effects result from material-specific 
interference or for competition from general processing resources (material-general 
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interference). To explore this, I will use secondary tasks that match those used in the 
implicit tests (material-specific tasks) and secondary tasks that do not match those in 
implicit tests (material-general tasks). All of the present implicit tests will use word 
stimuli. As a result, material-specific tasks will also use word stimuli and material-
general tasks will use number stimuli. To assess this, I will use two versions of the three-
odd task: one number-based and one word-based. The number-based three-odd task will 
present participants with a series of numbers; participants must respond whenever three 
odd digits appear in succession. The word-based three-odd task will present participants 
with a series of words; participants must respond whenever three two-syllable words are 
presented in a row. Number-based three-odd tasks have been commonly used as 
concurrent tasks in prior studies (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997). The 
word-based three-odd task has also been used in prior analyses of the role of material 
specificity in obtaining DA effects (e.g., Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000). 
 Prior research has indicated that frequency of responding to the concurrent task 
is also an important factor. The central bottleneck model (Pashler, 1994) proposes that 
certain processes (including response selection, memory encoding, and memory 
retrieval) require the use central bottleneck process. Importantly, only one critical 
process has access to the bottleneck process at any time. This analysis implies that the 
selection of a response to a concurrent task will be a source of disruption to memory 
retrieval. Critically, then, DA effects should be most apparent when participants must 
respond frequently to the concurrent task than when the task requires infrequent 
responding. That is, if the concurrent task requires frequent responding, it will 
frequently use the bottleneck process, which may disrupt retrieval processes from 
gaining access to the bottleneck process. This contrasts with the material-specificity 
hypothesis in that the bottleneck process is central and amodal, predicting that response 
  33
selection from any task (be it material-specific or material-general) in any modality will 
require the use of the central bottleneck and can disrupt memory retrieval. 
 These two secondary task considerations dictate a 2 (material specificity) × 2 
(response frequency) array in terms of type of secondary task used. Thus, the present 
study will use of four types of secondary tasks: (1) a choice reaction time (RT) tasks in 
which participants will be presented continuously with a series of words and must decide 
for each word whether it has one or two syllables, (2) a word-based three-odd task in 
which participants will be presented with a series of words and must respond whenever 
three two-syllable words are presented in a row, (3) a choice RT task in which 
participants will be presented with a series of numbers and must decide for each number 
whether it is odd or even, and (4) a number-based three-odd task in which participants 
will be presented with a series of numbers and must respond whenever three odd digits 
appear in succession. Material-specific secondary tasks will include the word-based 
three-odd and choice RT tasks; material-general secondary tasks will include the 
number-based three-odd and choice RT tasks. High-response secondary tasks will 
include the word-based and the number-based choice RT tasks; low-response secondary 
tasks will include the word-based and number-based three-odd tasks. 
 Thus, I will examine the magnitude of the DA effect produced by each type of 
secondary task to help delineate the specific conditions under which DA effects occur. I 
will also examine the secondary tasks costs produced by each of the types of implicit tests 
for several reasons. First, much prior research in the explicit domain has focused not 
only on the DA effect produced by the secondary task on the memory test, but also on the 
secondary task costs produced by the memory test. Second, such an analysis might 
provide a more sensitive manner in which to assess the role of attention during implicit 
retrieval. Specifically, exploration of secondary task costs uncovered the importance of 
attention to explicit retrieval, even when it was not revealed in analysis of DA effects on 
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memory performance (e.g., Craik et al., 1996). Third, assessment of both memory effects 
and secondary task costs provides a manner in which to fully explore the role of attention 
during implicit memory retrieval. The various theoretical positions described above 
make the same predictions for the size of the secondary task costs as they do for the 
effects on priming. 
 Secondary task costs will presently be measured in two manners. First, global 
secondary tasks costs produced by the implicit task. This will be measured by comparing 
a baseline condition (when the secondary task was performed alone under FA) to a DA 
condition (when the secondary task was performed with the memory test). This 
measures general secondary task costs produces by this task in which implicit retrieval is 
embedded, and not just costs associated with implicit reteival (i.e., priming). I am 
specifically interested in how implicit memory retrieval affects secondary task 
performance. As a result, I will also obtain a second measure of secondary task costs: the 
costs produced by old items relative to new items. This will be measured by comparing 
secondary task performance for old trials vs. new trials. Comparing secondary task costs 
across these two conditions will be informative to the actual cost produced by implicit 
retrieval. 
 Although this is not the first study to explore the role of attention during implicit 
retrieval (Gooding et al., 1999; Helman & Berry, 2003), it is the most complete. For 
example, Gooding et al. found no effect of dividing attention on a word stem completion 
task using a numerical secondary task. The implicit test was a perceptual, production 
test, and the secondary task was material-general and required infrequent responding. 
Further, secondary task costs were not measured. Thus, this study (and Helman & Berry) 
provides an incomplete analysis of attention and implicit retrieval.
  
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 This first experiment used a perceptual identification test. Attention was divided 
during the test phase only (all learning occurred under FA). Because the test is 
perceptual and requires stimulus identification, the two hypotheses predict that levels of 
priming for this test should be unaffected by dividing attention. First, according to the 
perceptual—conceptual hypothesis, perceptual implicit tests should be unaffected by a 
concurrent task. Second, according to the identification—production hypothesis, implicit 
tests that require stimulus identification should be unaffected by a secondary task. 
 Attention was divided with each of the four secondary tasks described above. DA 
effects were measured with respect to a baseline condition, in which participants 
performed the perceptual identification test in isolation. Although the perceptual—
conceptual hypothesis and the identification—production hypothesis prediction minimal 
effects of dividing attention, the nature of the secondary tasks may induce an effect. 
First, prior research with explicit memory has shown that material-specific interference 
causes a deleterious effect of DA. As a result, it would be expected that those secondary 
tasks using words (e.g., the word-based three-odd and choice RT tasks) will generally 
produce larger DA effects than secondary tasks that use numbers (the number-based 
three-odd and choice RT tasks). Second, according to central bottleneck models, 
response selection for the secondary task will interfere with memory retrieval and 
produce DA effects. Thus, this account would predict that those tasks that require 
frequent response selection (the word-based and number-based choice RT tasks) will 
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generally produce larger deficits than tasks that require infrequent response selection 
(the word-based and number-based three-odd tasks). 
 I also measured secondary task costs produced by the implicit test. As stated 
above, secondary task costs were measured in two manners: (1) Global secondary tasks 
costs produced by the perceptual identification task. This was measured by comparing a 
FA baseline condition to a DA condition. For this and all other experiments, the baseline 
is defined as the average of a pre-test baseline (when the secondary task was performed 
alone prior to it being performed in conjunction with the memory test) and a post-test 
baseline condition (when the secondary task was performed along after being performed 
in conjunction with the memory test). (2) Specific costs associated with implicit retrieval. 
In other words, the costs produced by old items relative to new items. Finally, baseline 
levels of secondary task performance (i.e., RT and accuracy) across each of the tasks were 
different. As a result, magnitudes of secondary task costs were not directly comparable 
across secondary tasks. 
Method 
 Participants. 80 undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit in an introductory psychology course. 
 Design & Materials. The DA conditions constituted a 2 (materials) × 2 
(frequency) design, with one additional FA control condition. Materials and frequency of 
the secondary task were both manipulated between-subjects. Participants took the 
perceptual identification test in isolation (FA) or in conjunction with one of four 
secondary tasks (DA), described in previous sections. 
 The same materials were used in all experiments, which consist of different 
implicit tests. The materials consisted of 60 critical examples from 60 different 
categories, from the norms of Battig and Montague (1969), Hunt and Hodge (1971), and 
Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004). The examples chosen from the 
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categories were moderate- to high-frequency associates of the category name. No two 
examples came from the same category. Critical examples were chosen to satisfy two 
additional constraints: (1) no two examples had the same word stems (the first three 
letters) and (2) each example’s word stem could be completed with at least five unique 
solutions. I also selected 30 examples from 30 additional categories which were used as 
filler items on each implicit test. Filler items were selected with same constrains 
described above. The critical examples were divided into two master study lists (A and B) 
of 30 words each. Half of the participants received study list A and the other half 
received study list B such that items are counterbalanced over old—new status as well as 
across each attention condition. 
 The perceptual identification test consisted of all 60 critical items (30 old items 
presented during the study phase and 30 new items not presented study list), randomly 
intermixed with 30 filler items. For half the participants in each attention condition, 
words from study list A were old and words from study list B were new, with the opposite 
being true for the other half of participants. Filler items were never presented to 
participants during the study phase. 
 Word-based secondary tasks consisted of a list of 45 moderate- to low-frequency 
one- and two-syllable words. Half of the words had one-syllable and the other half had 
two-syllables. None of the words in these tasks overlapped with critical items. Number-
based secondary tasks consisted of a list of 45 even and odd numbers between 0 and 9. 
Half were even and half were odd. For the word- and number-based three-odd tasks, 
there were 8 target sequences (three two-syllable words or three odd numbers in 
succession) in the list of 45 words or numbers. This list were repeated throughout the 
duration of its performance. The word- and number-based choice RT tasks used the 
same 45 words or numbers, again cycled throughout its duration. 
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 Procedure. Participants were tested individually. The experiment consisted of 
four parts: a calibration phase, a study phase, a distracter phase, and a test phase. 
Participants were initially told that experiment was a study of attention and perception. 
During the calibration phase, participants performed a perceptual identification task 
identical to the one performed during the test phase. For this task, participants were 
given a perceptual identification test. Each trial began with a prompt consisting of the 
words “get ready” above a plus sign (+). The prompt was centered on the computer 
screen for 500 ms. Following the prompt, each word was displayed in the same position 
as the plus sign for 16, 32, or 50 ms, followed by a backwards mask (a row of Xs). The 
word remained on the screen for an additional amount of time such that the total trial 
(excluding the prompt) lasted 5000 ms. The first block of trials presented the words for 
16 ms, the second block for 32 ms, and the final block for 50 ms. Participants were 
instructed to fixate on the cross to maximize their chances of identifying the words. They 
were instructed to name the word by saying it out loud. All responses were recorded by 
the experimenter and checked for correctness. The presentation speed that yielded 
closest to 30-40% correct during this phase determined later presentation speed during 
the test phase. 
 During the study phase, participants were presented with words from either 
study list A or study list B. Each word was presented in the center of the computer screen 
in white font on black background. Participants were instructed to read each word, and 
then rate the word’s pleasantness on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated very unpleasant 
and 7 indicated very pleasant. The word appeared on the screen for 3 s, within which the 
participants are to make a response. No mention was made of the subsequent memory 
test. 
 During the distracter phase, participants engaged in two separate cognitively-
engaging tasks. The first distracter task was an N-back working memory task. For this 
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task, participants judged whether or not the number currently on the computer screen 
matched the number presented on the preceding trial. This task lasted for three minutes. 
Next, the participants carried out one of the four secondary tasks. In the DA conditions, 
this served as the pretest baseline measure of the secondary task as well as the second 
distracter task. In the FA condition, this task merely served as the second distracter task. 
In the DA conditions, the task used was the same task later used to divide attention. In 
the FA condition, participants received one of the four tasks, with each secondary task 
being given to one quarter of the full-attention participants. Participants performed this 
task during the distracter phase for an additional three minutes. Participants were given 
feedback for this task after every 30 trials.2 Feedback consisted of a screen indicating 
their percent correct on the task for the preceding 30 trials. Participants were instructed 
to read over the feedback and to try to maintain a high level of accuracy throughout the 
task. 
 During the test phase, participants performed the same perceptual identification 
test as during the calibration phase. Each trial will begin with the “get ready” prompt for 
500 ms. Following the prompt, each word was displayed in the same position as the plus 
sign for 16 or 32 ms, depending upon the results from the calibration task (no participant 
ended up in the 50 ms condition). The word was followed by an immediate backwards 
mask (a row of Xs). Participants were instructed to name the word by saying it out loud. 
All responses will be recorded by the experimenter and checked for correctness. Each 
trial (excluding the prompt) lasted for a total of 5000 ms. The first few items in the test 
                                                 
2 Pilot testing revealed that participants struggled with the secondary task while doing 
the implicit test simultaneously. In other words, many participants were at (or even 
below) chance levels of performance. As a result, feedback (percent correct) was 
provided for each participant after every 30 trials with the aim of generally improving 
performance. The same feedback was provided during each FA baseline measure (pre-
test and post-test) and the divided attention measure (during the test phase) for each of 
the four experiments. 
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were filler items to allow participants to get used to the test. No mention of the 
connection between this task and the studied words was made. 
 One-fifth of the participants performed the perceptual identification task in 
isolation (FA). The remaining participants performed the task with one of the four 
secondary tasks (DA). Those participants who received the word-based three-odd task 
were presented aurally with a series of words at a rate of one word every 2500 ms. 
Participants were told to listen to each word and make a response (by pressing the 
“Space Bar”) whenever three two-syllable words (a target sequence) appeared in 
succession. Those who received the number-based three-odd task were presented aurally 
over headphones with a series of numbers at a rate of one number every 2500 ms. They 
were told to listen to each number and make a response (by pressing the “Space Bar”) 
whenever three odd numbers (a target sequence) appear in succession. Participants who 
received the word-based choice RT task were presented aurally with a series of words at 
a rate of one word every 2500 ms. On each trial participants were told to listen to the 
word and indicate whether it has one- or two-syllables (by pressing the “1” key for one-
syllable, and the “2” key for two-syllables). Participants who received the number based 
choice RT task will be presented aurally with a series of numbers at a rate of one number 
every 2500 ms. On each trial, participants were told to listen to the number and indicate 
whether it is even or odd (by pressing the “1” key for odd, and the “2” key for even). 
Participants in the DA conditions performed the secondary tasks throughout the entire 
perceptual identification test. Participants in the DA condition were told to stress each 
task equally and were again given feedback after every 30 trials of the secondary task. 
 After the test phase, those participants in the DA conditions again performed 
their secondary task alone for an additional three minutes, with feedback after every 30 
trials. Finally, after completion of the experiment, all participants were given a post-test 
awareness questionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of a series of increasingly specific 
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questions assessing the participants’ knowledge of the connection between the study and 
test phases. This questionnaire was used determine whether or not participants engaged 
in explicit retrieval of prior study episodes. (see Appendix A for the specific questions). 
Results 
 Implicit Test. Each verbal response was recorded as correct or incorrect (the 
latter category included non-responses). With 30 old items, and 30 new items, 
proportion correct was determined by the number correct for old items out of 30, and 
the number correct for new items out of 30. Implicit results (Proportion Old, Proportion 
New, Proportion Priming) are presented in Table 1. As can be seen in that table (see also 
Figure 1), overall priming appears to be found for the FA condition. Further, dividing 
attention during retrieval appeared to have no overall effect on levels of priming. In fact, 
none of the five attention conditions appear to produce different levels of priming. 
 Priming rates from the perceptual identification test were submitted to a series of 
analyses. Unless otherwise specified, all alpha-levels were set at 0.05. Proportion correct 
for the new condition (baseline) did not differ across attention condition, F(4, 75) = 1.61, 
MSe = 0.05. Priming in the FA condition was submitted to a t-test to establish that this 
condition produced significant priming. Priming was significantly greater than zero, 
t(15) = 5.68, p < 0.05. Priming for each DA condition was also significant, t(15)s > 4. 
Priming across all conditions was further analyzed using two separate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) tests. The first analysis was a one-factor ANOVA, with 5 levels of that 
factor (attention condition). The five levels of this factor were the FA condition, and each 
of the four DA conditions. Attention condition was a between-subjects factor. This 
ANOVA revealed no effect of attention condition, F < 1, indicating that priming did not 
vary over attention conditions. Priming was further analyzed with a 2 (materials: 
material-general vs. material-specific) × 2 (frequency: high frequency vs. low frequency) 
ANOVA, with both materials and frequency as between-subjects factors. There was no 
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main effect of materials, F < 1, indicating that material-specific and material-general 
tasks produced equivalent levels of priming. There was no main effect of frequency, F < 
1, indicating that high and low frequency tasks produced equivalent levels of priming, 
and no materials × frequency interaction, F < 1. Finally, it should be noted that whether 
participants reported intentionally thinking back to the prior list during the test had no 
effect on any of the results. 
 Secondary Task. There were four secondary task conditions: material-general 
high frequency (MGHF); material-specific high frequency (MSHF); material-general low 
frequency (MGLF); and material-specific low frequency (MSLF). Secondary task 
performance was measured using proportion correct (accuracy) and reaction time (RT). 
All analyses will be reported with respect to each dependent variable. Secondary task 
costs were obtained for each dependent variable by subtracting secondary task 
performance under DA from secondary task performance under FA. FA secondary task 
performance was obtained by taking the mean performance (proportion correct and RT) 
for the pre-test and post-test phases. Secondary task costs were analyzed in two ways: (1) 
Performance in the FA condition was compared to performance in the DA condition to 
assess overall costs produced by the perceptual identification task. This was analyzed 
using a set of t-tests for each of the four secondary task conditions. The magnitude of 
secondary task costs were not compared across conditions due to issues of scaling as the 
result of different baseline levels. (2) Performance for secondary task trials that were 
associated with ‘old’ trials on the implicit test were compared performance for secondary 
task trials that were associated with ‘new’ trials on the implicit test. This assessed the 
costs specifically associated with the priming component of the perceptual identification 
task. This analysis was performed only for high frequency trials. Low frequency tasks 
could not be analyzed in this manner because responding (or failing to respond) on a 
particular trial was dependent upon that trial, plus the two previous trials. Thus if a 
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participants failed to make a response to a critical sequence, it could have been the result 
of interference of any of the previous three trials. Because there were two items for the 
secondary task associated with a single trial for the implicit test, I also measured costs 
associated with the first item compared to the second item (again, this was possible only 
for the high frequency tasks). 
 Accuracy and reaction times are presented in Table 2. For the high frequency 
tasks, all items associated with filler trials were excluded. As can be seen from that table, 
there appear to be overall secondary task costs produced by the perceptual identification 
task. Specifically, the implicit test appeared to decrease accuracy across each of the four 
conditions. Data were first analyzed using a series of t-tests. An overall DA cost to 
secondary task performance was found, t(63) = 9.45. Specific costs were also found for 
the MGHF condition, t(15) = 5.68; for the MSHF condition, t(15) = 5.96; for the MGLF 
condition, t(15) = 3.07; and for the MSLF condition, t(15) = 7.70. 
 Accuracy results were then submitted to a 2 (order: first vs. second) × 2 (status: 
old vs. new) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. As stated above, 
this analysis was restricted to the two high frequency tasks. This analysis revealed a main 
effect of order, F(1, 31) = 4.05, MSe = 0.l0, indicating that accuracy for the first items was 
lower than accuracy for the second items. There was a non-significant trend towards a 
main effect of status, F(1, 31) = 4.05, MSe = 0.02, p < 0.06, indicating that accuracy was 
marginally higher for items on old trials than for items on new trials. The interaction 
between order and status was significant, F(1, 31) = 12.81, MSe = 0.00, indicating that 
the benefit for secondary task performance for old items was larger for the items 
presented synchronously with the test item (see Figure 2). Given this interaction, simple 
effects were tested which compared old and new trials for each order separately. These 
analyses revealed a difference between old and new if they were presented first, t(31) = -
3.45, indicating that proportion correct was higher for old trials than new trials. The 
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difference between old and new if they were presented second was not significant, t(31) = 
.31. It must be noted that this difference between old and new trials is driven by the 
MSHF condition; the MGHF condition shows no difference between old and new trials 
(see Table 2). 
 RT results (Table 2) reflect median reaction times for correct trials. Incorrect 
trials were excluded from these analyses. For the high frequency tasks, filler trials were 
again excluded, as were trials with a RT under 500 ms. RTs are measured from the 
beginning of the onset of the word or number. These auditory files take over 500 ms to 
play through. All responses under 500 ms were coded as a non-response because 
participants were responding before fully hearing the number or word. These exclusions 
as well as other non-responses amounted to less than 1% of all trials for the MGHF and 
MSHF conditions. As with the accuracy results, there appear to be overall secondary task 
costs produced by the perceptual identification test. Unlike the accuracy results, 
however, these secondary task costs appear to be restricted to the high frequency tasks. 
RT data were first analyzed first using a set of t-tests. Results confirmed what was 
observed in the table. Overall, there were secondary task costs, t(63) = -5.28. For each 
specific condition, costs were found for the MGHF condition, t(15) = -8.59, and for the 
MSHF condition, t(15) = -10.90. However, no costs were found for the MGLF condition, 
t(15) = -0.94, or for the MSLF condition, t(15) = 0.41. 
 RT results were similarly submitted to a 2 (order) × 2 (status) ANOVA, with order 
and status as within-subjects factors. As with the accuracy results, this analysis was 
restricted to the two high frequency tasks. This analysis revealed a main effect of order, 
F(1, 31) = 126.69, MSe = 22511.11, indicating that RTs for first items were higher than for 
second items. Neither the main effect of status nor the interaction were significant, Fs < 
1. 
Discussion 
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 As a preliminary point, I found that the perceptual identification task produced 
robust priming in the FA condition. This is the typical testing condition, and fits well 
with other studies that also found high levels of priming for this test (e.g., Hirshman et 
al., 2001; Keane, Wong, Verfaellie, 2004; Mulligan, 2002; Mulligan, 2003; Mulligan & 
Hornstein, 2000). This is critical in the present case because it implies that there is a 
substantial ability to measure reductions in primary should any be produced by the DA 
conditions. 
 Despite the high levels of priming in the control (FA) condition, none of the DA 
conditions produced any reductions in priming. This result is consistent with the 
predictions from research concerning the perceptual-conceptual and identification-
production dissociations. These each predict that the perceptual identification test 
(which is perceptual, and involves identification) should not rely heavily upon 
attentional resources, and thus be unaffected by a secondary task. Further, it was found 
that the material-general and material-specific groups produced equivalent levels of 
priming. That is, both the material-general and the material-specific secondary task 
failed to affect levels of priming. These results are inconsistent with research showing 
that material-specific tasks produce robust DA effects on memory retrieval. Further, the 
high-frequency and low frequency groups produced equivalent levels of priming. That is, 
the high frequency and low frequency secondary tasks failed to affect levels of priming. 
These results are inconsistent with the predictions from the central bottleneck model 
that tasks involving frequent response selection should affect memory retrieval. All of the 
above results, however, are consistent with the automaticity hypothesis. 
 Despite the fact that the secondary task failed to produce deficits to implicit 
memory, it was found that implicit retrieval produced robust global secondary task costs 
for accuracy and RT. It was found that generally, the perceptual identification task 
reduced accuracy and increased RT, relative to a FA condition (where the secondary task 
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was performed alone). Specifically, the implicit test decreased accuracy for each of the 
four secondary task conditions RTs, however, increased significantly in only the two high 
frequency secondary tasks. For the high frequency tasks, it was further found that 
performance was lower (lower accuracy, higher RTs) for the first item in the trial 
compared to the second item. Because the first item was presented synchronously with 
the implicit test item, and the second item was presented 2.5 s after, this provides further 
indication of the effect that the test items had on the secondary task. These results 
demonstrate only the costs produced by the task in which implicit retrieval is couched, 
and do not speak directly to the costs associated specifically with implicit retrieval. These 
costs were specifically measured by comparing items for the secondary task associated 
with old items for the implicit test to items for the secondary task associated with new 
items for the implicit test. Critically, I found that for accuracy, there was a near 
significant trend for secondary task items associated with old trials to show an 
improvement in performance compared to new items. This indicates that the secondary 
task became easier for old trials (when implicit retrieval can play a role in task 
performance) compared to new trials. Further analysis of old trials compared to new 
trials (specifically for the first items presented) yielded a significant difference, with 
performance for old trials being easier. This difference was not present for the second 
items present. This further demonstrates that the secondary task did in fact get easier 
during an old trial of the implicit test. 
 Taken together, these results highlight several critical points: (1) implicit retrieval 
(on the perceptual identification task) is immune to DA effects, as indicated by the lack 
of a DA effect on priming; (2) the perceptual identification task generally produces costs 
to a secondary task, as indicated by the general and specific secondary task costs 
produced by the implicit test; and (3) for accuracy, implicit retrieval specifically seems to 
have no negative effect (and appears to make performance on the secondary task easier, 
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for proportion correct). I will address the implications of these findings later in the 
general discussion.
  
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 The second experiment used a word-stem completion test, a test classified as a 
perceptual task and a production task. Consequently, the hypotheses make conflicting 
predictions about the effects of dividing attention. The perceptual—conceptual 
hypothesis predicts that perceptual priming should be unaffected by dividing attention. 
The identification—production hypothesis, however, indicates that dividing attention 
should disrupt production priming. Again, attention was divided during the test phase 
only, using the same four secondary tasks described in Experiment 1. 
Method 
 Participants. 80 undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit in an introductory psychology course. 
 Design & Materials. The design and materials were identical to the first 
experiment with the following exception: participants took a word-stem completion test 
during the test phase. During this test participants were presented with a series of 90 
word stems, each consisting of the first three letters of the word followed by a blank. Of 
the 90 stems, 30 were completable with old words (presented during the study phase), 
30 were completable with critical new words (from the non-presented list), and 30 were 
filler. 
 Procedure. The study phase and distracter phase were identical to Experiment 1. 
During the test phase, participants took a word-stem completion test. One-fifth took the 
test alone (FA) and the remaining took the test with one of the four secondary tasks 
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described above (DA). Word stems were presented at a fixed rate (one stem every 5000 
ms). Participants were told to read each word stem and complete it with the first word 
that comes to mind by saying the completed word out loud. All responses will be 
recorded by the experimenter and were checked for correctness. Again, after the test 
phase, participants in the DA conditions performed their secondary task alone for an 
additional three minutes. Finally, all participants were given the same post-test 
questionnaire as in the first two experiments. 
Results 
 Implicit Test. Each verbal response made by the participant was recorded as 
either correct (they produced the critical item) or incorrect (they failed to produce the 
critical item). Implicit results are presented in Table 3. As can be seen in that table (see 
also Figure 3), overall priming appears to be found for the FA condition. Further, levels 
of priming appear equivalent across conditions. 
 Proportion correct for the new condition (baseline) did not differ across attention 
condition, F(4, 75) = 1.61, MSe = 0.05. Priming rates from the FA condition were first 
submitted to a t-test to establish that this task produced significant overall priming in 
this version of the category production test. Priming was significantly greater than zero, 
t(15) = 7.50, p < 0.05. Priming for each DA condition was also significant, ts > 5. Priming 
was unaffected by attention condition, F < 1. As can be seen in Figure 3, there does 
appear to be a slight visual trend towards a reduction in priming across DA condition. 
Given this, a specific test of the FA condition and the lowest DA condition (the MSLF 
condition) was conducted. This also yielded a non-significant effect (p = 0.11). From this, 
it is clear that none of the conditions yielded any significant decrement to levels of 
priming. 
 Priming in the DA conditions was further analyzed with a 2 (materials) × 2 
(frequency) ANOVA, with both materials and frequency as between-subjects factors. 
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There was no main effect of materials, F(1, 60) = 1.38, MSE = 0.01, indicating that 
material-specific and material-general tasks produced equivalent levels of priming. 
There was no main effect of frequency, F < 1, indicating that high frequency and low 
frequency tasks produced equivalent levels of priming. Finally, there was no materials × 
frequency interaction, F < 1. As in Experiment 1, whether participants reported 
intentionally thinking back to the prior study list had no effect on the results. 
 Secondary Task. Secondary task accuracy and RT results are presented in Table 
4. The same exclusion criteria from Experiments 1 and 2 were used. As can be seen from 
that table, there appear to be overall secondary task costs produced by the word-stem 
completion task. Specifically, the implicit test reduced performance greatly across each 
of the four conditions. Data were first analyzed using a series of t-tests. There was an 
overall secondary task cost, t(63) = 9.76. Specific costs were also found for the MGHF 
condition, t(15) = 6.58; for the MSHF condition, t(15) = 5.66; for the MGLF condition, 
t(15) = 3.84; and for the MSLF condition, t(15) = 3.93. 
 Accuracy results from the high frequency tasks were then submitted to a 2 (order) 
× 2 (status) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of order, F(1, 31) = 16.24, MSe = 0.01, indicating that accuracy for 
the first item was lower than accuracy for the second item. The interaction was 
marginally significant, F(1, 31) = 4.08, MSe = 0.00, p < 0.06, indicating that the 
difference between old and new trials was larger for items presented first. There was no 
main effect of status, F(1, 31) = 2.70, MSe = 0.01. Given this near-significant interaction 
(see Figure 4), simple effects were tested which compared old and new trials for each 
order separately. These analyses revealed a difference between old and new if they were 
presented first, t(31) = -2.37, indicating that proportion correct was higher for old trials 
than new trials. The difference between old and new if they were presented second was 
not significant, t(31) = -0.34. 
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 RT results are also presented in Table 4. The same exclusion from Experiment 1 
was used (less than 2% of all trials for the MGHF condition, and less than 1% of all trials 
for the MSHF conditions were excluded). As with the accuracy results, there is an overall 
secondary task costs produced by the perceptual identification test, t(63) = -5.86. For 
each specific condition, costs were found for the MGHF condition, t(15) = -6.61, for the 
MSHF condition, t(15) = -8.49, and for the MGLF condition, t(15) = -2.47. No costs were 
found, however, for the MSLF condition, t(15) = 0.94. 
 RT results from the high frequency tasks were then submitted to a 2 (order) × 2 
(status) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. This analysis revealed 
a main effect of order, F(1, 31) = 27.31, MSe = 36882.18, indicating that RTs for the first 
item were higher than RTs for the second item. There was no main effect of status, nor 
an interaction, Fs < 1. 
Discussion 
 As in many prior studies, I found that the word-stem completion task produced 
significant levels of priming in a FA retrieval condition. (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1999; 
Gabrieli et al., 1994; Horton & Nash, 1999; Keane et al., 1991; Schwartz, 1989). 
 The results concerning the effect of the secondary task on levels of priming was 
consistent with the results from Experiment 1, which showed that priming was immune 
to a concurrent task. Importantly, it was found that none of the four DA conditions 
significantly diminished priming relative to the FA condition. This result is consistent 
with the prediction from the perceptual-conceptual distinction, which indicates that a 
perceptual test should not be attention-demanding and consequently should be 
unaffected by a secondary task. It is, however, inconsistent with the prediction from the 
identification-production distinction, which indicates that a production task should be 
attention-demanding, and thus affected by a secondary task. Further, it was found that 
the material-general and material-specific groups, and the high and low frequency 
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groups produced equivalent levels of priming. These results are inconsistent with 
research demonstrating material-specific interference, and the predictions from the 
central bottleneck model. All of these results are, however, consistent with the 
automaticity hypothesis. 
 One further point about the implicit memory results requires mentioning. 
Numerically, there appeared to be DA effects on priming. Although each individual 
condition, material-specific vs. material general conditions, and high- vs. low-frequency 
conditions, failed to affect priming, there was a visual trend towards a decline (see Figure 
3). Thus, it appeared that dividing attention might have produced at least some 
reduction in priming. However, given that none of the DA conditions (including the DA 
condition that produced lowest priming) significantly differed from the FA condition, 
there is no compelling evidence that DA has an effect on implicit retrieval. I will return to 
this issue in a power analysis reported following Experiment 4. 
 Despite the fact that the secondary task failed to produce significant deficits to 
implicit memory, it was again found that implicit retrieval produced robust global 
secondary task costs for accuracy and RT. The pattern again mirrors that found in the 
first experiment. The word-stem completion task reduced accuracy and increased RT, 
relative to a FA condition. Specifically, the implicit test decreased accuracy for each of 
the four secondary task conditions. RTs increased in both of the high frequency 
conditions, and for the number-based low frequency condition. It was further found that 
performance was worse (lower accuracy, higher RTs) for the first item compared to the 
second item. This pattern of results generally fits with those found in the previous 
experiment and demonstrates that the word-stem completion task produced secondary 
task costs. However, the specific interest is in whether implicit retrieval produces 
secondary task costs. These costs were specifically measured by comparing old trials to 
new trials. Critically, I found that secondary-task items associated with old trials were 
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not significantly different (in terms of both accuracy and RTs) than secondary-task items 
associated with new trials, although there was a non-significant numerical trend for 
accuracy to be higher for old relative to new trials. Analysis of old trials compared to new 
trials (specifically for the first items presented) yielded a significant difference, with 
higher performance for old trials. This difference was not present for the second items 
present. This further demonstrates that the secondary task did in fact get easier during 
an old trial of the implicit test. 
 Taken together, these results demonstrate the several things: (1) implicit retrieval 
(on the word-stem completion task) appears to be immune to DA effects, as indicated by 
the lack of a DA effect on priming; (2) the word-stem completion task generally produces 
costs to secondary tasks; but (3) implicit retrieval specifically had no effect on secondary 
task performance as indicated by the lack of a difference in secondary-task costs for old 
and new trials. Further, simple effects analyses indicated that the secondary task 
improved (for proportion correct) during old trials. These results fit well with the results 
of the first experiment.
  
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 This third experiment used a category exemplar production test. Again, attention 
was divided during the test phase only. Because this is conceptual and requires stimulus 
production, both hypotheses predict that levels of priming for this test should be 
disrupted by dividing attention. Attention was divided at test only, using the same four 
secondary tasks described in Experiment 1. 
Method 
 Participants. 80 undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit in an introductory psychology course. 
 Design & Materials. The design and materials were identical to the first two 
experiments with the following exception: participants took a category exemplar 
production test during the test phase. During this test participants were presented 
visually with a series of 90 category names. Of the 90 categories, 30 corresponded to old 
items (presented during the study phase), 30 corresponded to critical new items (from 
the non-presented list), and 30 were filler. 
 Procedure. The study phase and distracter phase were identical to the first two 
experiments. During the test phase, participants took a category exemplar test. One-fifth 
took the test alone (FA) and the remaining took the test with one of the four secondary 
tasks described above (DA). For this test, participants were presented with a series of 90 
category names in a random order. Participants were told to read each category and 
name the first exemplar from that category that comes to mind, saying the word out 
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loud. Category names were presented at a fixed rate (one category every 5000 ms). All 
responses were recorded by the experimenter and checked for correctness. Again, after 
the test phase, participants in the DA conditions performed their secondary task alone 
for an additional three minutes. Finally, all participants were given the same post-test 
questionnaire as in the first two experiments. 
Results 
 Implicit Test. Each verbal response made by a participant was recorded as either 
correct (they produced the critical item), or incorrect (they failed to produce the critical 
item). If participants failed to respond, the item was scored as incorrect. Proportion 
correct was determined by the number of correct old items out of 30, and the number of 
correct new items out of 30. Implicit results are presented in Table 5. As can be seen in 
that table (see also Figure 5), overall priming appears to be found for the FA condition. 
Further, as found in the previous experiments, dividing attention during retrieval 
appeared to have no effect on priming. 
 Proportion correct for the new condition (baseline) did not differ across attention 
condition, F(4, 75) = 1.30, MSe = 0.01. Priming rates from the FA condition were first 
submitted to a t-test to establish that this task produced significant overall priming in 
this version of the category exemplar production test. Priming was significantly greater 
than zero, t(15) = 4.30, p < 0.05. Priming for each DA condition was also significant, ts > 
3. Priming across all conditions was further analyzed using two separate ANOVAs. The 
first was a one-factor ANOVA, with 5 levels of that factor (attention condition). The five 
levels were the same as in previous experiments. This ANOVA revealed no effect of 
attention condition, F < 1, indicating that priming in each of DA conditions was 
equivalent to the FA condition. Priming was further analyzed with a 2 (materials) × 2 
(frequency) ANOVA, with both materials and frequency as between-subjects factors. 
There were no significant effects, Fs < 1, indicating that neither the materials or 
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frequency of responding of the secondary task affected priming. As in previous 
experiments, whether participants reported intentionally thinking back to the prior list 
had no effect on the results. 
 Secondary Task. Secondary task performance was again measured using 
proportion correct and RT. 
 Accuracy results are presented in Table 6. The same exclusion criteria from 
earlier experiments were used. As can be seen from that table, there appear to be overall 
secondary task costs produced by the category-exemplar production task. Specifically, 
the implicit test appeared to lower performance greatly across each of the four 
conditions. Data were first analyzed using a series of t-tests. There was an overall cost to 
the secondary task while performing it with the implicit test, t(63) = 11.47. Specific costs 
were also found for the MGHF condition, t(15) = 4.92; for the MSHF condition, t(15) = 
9.67; for the MGLF condition, t(15) = 8.90; and for the MSLF condition, t(15) = 4.41. 
 Accuracy results for the high frequency tasks were then submitted to a 2 (order) × 
2 (status) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of order, F(1, 31) = 45.78, MSe = 0.01, indicating that accuracy for 
the first item was lower than accuracy for the second item. There was no main effect of 
status, nor an interaction Fs < 1. 
 RT results are also presented in Table 6. The same exclusion criteria from earlier 
experiments were used (less than 4% of all trials for the MGHF condition, and less than 
3% of all trials for the MSHF conditions were excluded). As with the accuracy results, 
there appear to be overall secondary task costs produced by the category exemplar 
production test. Unlike the accuracy results, however, these secondary task costs appear 
to be restricted to the high frequency tasks. RT data were analyzed first using a set of t-
tests. Results confirmed what was observed in the table. There was an overall secondary 
task cost, t(63) = -5.63. For each specific condition, costs were found for the MGHF 
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condition, t(15) = -15.63, and for the MSHF condition, t(15) = -10.35. However, no costs 
were found for the MGLF condition, t(15) = -0.49, or for the MSLF condition, t(15) = 
0.54. 
 RT results from the high frequency tasks were then submitted to a 2 (order) × 2 
(status) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. This analysis revealed 
a main effect of order, F(1, 31) = 213.94, MSe = 21405.43, indicating that accuracy for the 
first item was lower than accuracy for the second item. There was no main effect of 
status, F(1, 31) = 1.68, MSe = 5217.84. The interaction approached significance, F(1, 31) = 
3.17, MSe = 7152.04, p < 0.10, indicating a slight trend towards differences between RTs 
for old trials and new trials to be larger for first items (see Figure 6). Given this near-
significant interaction, simple effects were tested which compared old and new trials for 
each order separately. These analyses revealed a nearly significant difference between 
old and new trials if they were presented first, t(31) = 1.97, p < 0.06, indicating faster 
RTs for old items relative to new items. The difference between old and new if they were 
presented second was not significant, t(31) = -0.59. 
Discussion 
 I found that this task produced significant levels of priming for the category 
exemplar production test. This fits with numerous other studies, which show high levels 
of priming (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1999; Kinoshita, 1989, Light, Prull, & Kennison, 2000; 
Mulligan, 1997; Mulligan et al., 1999; Mulligan & Stone, 1999; Vaidya et al., 1999). 
 The results concerning the effect of the secondary task on levels of priming was 
consistent with the results from the earlier experiments, each of which showed that 
priming was immune to a concurrent task. This result is inconsistent with several of the 
predictions discussed earlier. Firstly, both the perceptual-conceptual and identification-
production dissociations predict that the category exemplar production test (which is 
conceptual, and involves production) should be attention-demanding, and thus be 
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affected by a secondary task. Further, it was found that the material-general and 
material-specific groups, and the high and low frequency groups produced equivalent 
levels of priming. These results are inconsistent with research demonstrating material-
specific interference, and with the predictions from the central bottleneck model. Again, 
all of these results are consistent with the automaticity hypothesis. 
 Despite the fact that the secondary task failed to produce deficits to implicit 
memory, it was found that implicit retrieval produced robust global secondary task costs 
for accuracy and RT. Once again, this pattern mirrors one found in the previous 
experiments of this study. The category exemplar production task lowered accuracy and 
increased RT, relative to a FA condition. Specifically, for each of the four secondary task 
conditions, accuracy was significantly lower in the DA condition. RTs, however, 
significantly increased in only the two high frequency secondary tasks. It was further 
found that performance was lower (lower accuracy, higher RTs) for the first item 
compared to the second item. As a whole, these results indicate that the category 
exemplar production task produced secondary task costs. For specific costs associated 
with implicit retrieval, I generally found that secondary items associated with old trials 
were no different (in terms of both accuracy and RTs) than secondary items associated 
with new trials. There was, however, a near-significant difference in RTs between old and 
new items, when they were presented first. This pattern of an improvement to secondary 
task performance during old trials fits with similar patterns found in Experiments 1 and 
2 (which showed improvement for proportion correct).  
 Taken together, the pattern of results fit very well with the findings from the 
previous experiments that the secondary task produced no effect on implicit retrieval, 
and implicit retrieval had no negative effect (and a slight positive effect) on secondary 
task performance. Again, the implications will be returned to in the general discussion.
  
 
 
CHAPTER IX 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
 The fourth experiment will use a category verification test, a test classified as a 
conceptual task and an identification task. Consequently, the hypotheses make 
conflicting predictions about the effects of dividing attention. The perceptual—
conceptual hypothesis predicts that conceptual priming should be disrupted by dividing 
attention. The identification—production hypothesis, however, indicates that this 
identification task should be unaffected by dividing attention. Again, attention will be 
divided during the test phase only, using the same four secondary tasks described in 
Experiment 1. 
Method 
 Participants. 63 undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit in an introductory psychology course. 
 Design & Materials. The design and materials were identical to those in the 
earlier experiments with the exception that during the test phase, participants took a 
category verification test. This test consisted of presentation of a series of pairs of 
category names and category examples. For some of the pairs, the example came from 
the category with which it was paired (yes-items); for others, the example, did not come 
from the category with which it was paired (no-items). Typically, for category verification 
tests, priming effects are often larger for yes- than no-items (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1999). 
As a result, I wanted a majority of critical yes-items. To create the materials for this test, 
each master study list (A and B) of 30 examples was divided into three further sub-sets 
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(1, 2, and 3) of 10 items each. Using these sets, three separate lists (1, 2, and 3) were 
created for lists A and B. List 1 paired words on sets 1 and 2 with the category from which 
it comes (yes-items) and words on set 3 items with a category from which it does not 
come (no-items). List 2 paired words on sets 1 and 3 with the category from which it 
comes (yes-items) and words on set 2 items with a category from which it does not come 
(no-items). List 3 paired words on sets 2 and 3 with the category from which it comes 
(yes-items) and words on set 1 items with a category from which it does not come (no-
items). Thus each test list had 20 critical yes-items and 10 critical no-items in both the 
old and new conditions. Because this was done for both list A and B, this created six 
different lists, counterbalanced across participants. 
 The test consisted of presentation of 90 pairs, of which 30 examples were old, 30 
examples were new, and 30 examples were filler. Of the 30 old items, 20 were yes-items 
and 10 were no-items; of the 30 new items, 20 were yes-items and 10 were no items. To 
create equal numbers of yes- and no-items across the test, 5 filler items were yes-items 
and 25 were no-items, creating 45 yes-items and 45 no-items across the entire test. 
 Procedure. Prior to the study phase, participants engaged in a practice task to get 
accustomed to activating a microphone attached to a voice key that would be used during 
the test phase. Participants were presented with a blue screen with the word ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
on it. They were to read the word out loud. If the voice key was activated, the screen 
changed color. Participants were told to try to activate the voice key on their first attempt 
on every trial. This task lasted for 40 trials. After this practice phase, participants began 
the study phase. The study phase and distracter phase were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. During the test phase, participants took a category verification test. One-
fifth took the test alone (FA) and the remaining took the test with one of the four 
secondary tasks described above (DA). Each trial consisted of a presentation of a 
category alone for 1000 ms. Next, a word appeared on the screen below the category 
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name. The word was presented for 4000 ms. Participants were instructed to read the 
category when they first saw it, then read the word after it is presented and quickly 
indicate whether or not the example comes from the category with which it is presented 
by saying “yes” or “no” out loud. Responses were recorded by a microphone attached to a 
voice key, which recorded the interval between visual presentation of the word pair and 
the onset of the verbal response. The experimenter also recorded answers for their 
correctness and monitored the participant’s performance for non-response vocalizations 
(e.g., coughs, false starts) that might trip the voice key. Again, after the test phase, 
participants in the DA conditions performed their secondary task alone for an additional 
three minutes. Finally, all participants were given the same post-test questionnaire as in 
Experiment 1. 
Results 
 Implicit Test. Three participants yielded extremely high levels of priming (i.e., 
between 500 – 800 ms). Outlier analysis confirmed that these participants were 
aberrant, relative to the rest of the participants. Outlier analysis consisted of calculating 
the interquartile range (IQR) for each condition. The IQR was multiplied by 1.5 and was 
added to the third quartile and subtracted from the first quartile. This yielded a range of 
values for each condition; any participant who scored outside that range was considered 
an outlier and replaced (see Moore & McCabe, 1998). As a result, these three participants 
were excluded, which yielded an effective sample size of N = 60. 
In addition to recording RTs, each verbal response was also scored as either 
correct or incorrect. All implicit test analyses were performed with filler trials, incorrect 
trials, and trials with false starts omitted (less than 1% of all trials were excluded). 
Critically, unlike other experiments, DA altered baseline (new) performance. In other 
words, for new items, RTs were slower under DA than under FA, F(4, 55) = 8.13, MSE = 
61681.42. Post-hoc testing (using Tukey’s HSD test) revealed that each performance for 
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new items was higher for each DA condition, relative to the FA condition. As a result, 
comparing raw priming scores across conditions raises the potential of scaling artifacts. 
To address this, each priming score was transformed into a proportion change from 
baseline measure [ ( New RT - Old RT) /New RT ]. The proportion change measure and 
raw priming scores yielded the exact same pattern of results. As a result, the scaling 
artifact is not a major concern and all priming results are presented with respect to RTs. 
Level of priming (RT) for each attention condition is plotted in Figure 7. Implicit results 
(New RT, Old RT, and Priming RT) are presented in Table 7. As can be seen from that 
table (see also Figure 7), overall priming appears to be found for the FA condition. 
Further, there appears to be a numerical decrease in mean priming across DA 
conditions. DA, however, also appeared to increase variability, relative to the FA 
condition. I will return to these points later in the discussion. 
Priming rates from the FA condition were first submitted to a t-test to establish 
that this task produced significant overall priming in this version of the category 
production test. Priming was significantly greater than zero, t(11) = 4.43. Unlike other 
experiments, however, priming failed to reach significance for any of the DA conditions, 
ts < 1 presumably because of the high variability in these conditions. Priming across all 
conditions was further analyzed using two separate ANOVAs. The first was a one-factor 
ANOVA, with 5 levels of that factor (attention condition). The five levels of this factor 
were the same as in the first experiment. This ANOVA revealed no effect of attention 
condition, F < 1, indicating that priming was equivalent across each condition. Priming 
was further analyzed with a 2 (materials) × 2 (frequency) ANOVA, with both materials 
and frequency as between-subjects factors. There was no main effect of materials nor an 
main effect of frequency, Fs < 1, indicating that material-specific and material-general, 
and high and low frequency tasks produced equivalent levels of priming. Finally, there 
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was no materials × frequency interaction, F < 1. As in Experiment 1, whether participants 
reported intentionally thinking back to the prior study list had no effect on the results. 
 Secondary Task. Secondary task performance was again measured using 
proportion correct and RT. 
 Accuracy results are presented in Table 8. The same exclusion criteria from 
Experiment 1 were used. As can be seen from that table, there appear to be overall 
secondary task costs produced by the category verification task. Specifically, the implicit 
test appeared to reduce performance across each of the four conditions. Data were first 
analyzed using a series of t-tests. There was an overall secondary task cost, t(47) = 7.08. 
Specific costs were also found for the MGHF condition, t(11) = 3.80; for the MSHF 
condition, t(11) = 4.59; for the MSLF condition, t(11) = 4.34; but not for the MGLF 
condition, t(11) = 1.50. 
 Accuracy results from the high frequency tasks were then submitted to a 2 (order) 
× 2 (status) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of order, F(1, 23) = 11.50, MSe = 0.01, indicating that accuracy for 
the first item was lower than accuracy for the second item. There was no main effect of 
status nor an interaction, Fs < 1. 
 RT results are also presented in Table 8. The same exclusion criteria from the 
previous experiments were used (less than 1% of all trials for the MGHF and MSHF 
conditions were excluded). As with the accuracy results, there appear to be overall 
secondary task costs produced by the perceptual identification test. RT data were first 
analyzed using a set of t-tests. Results confirmed what was observed in the table. There 
was an overall secondary task cost, t(47) = -5.07. For each specific condition, costs were 
found for the MGHF condition, t(11) = -6.18, for the MSHF condition, t(11) = -8.77, and 
for the MGLF condition, t(11) = -2.24. No costs were found, however, for the MSLF 
condition, t(11) = 0.54. 
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 RT results from the high frequency tasks were submitted to a 2 (order) × 2 
(status) ANOVA, with order and status as within-subjects factors. This analysis revealed 
a main effect of order, F(1, 23) = 8.02, MSe = 20312.55, indicating that RTs for the first 
item were higher than RTs for the second item. There was no main effect of status, F < 1, 
nor an interaction, F(1, 23) = 2.11, MSe = 6314.31. 
Discussion 
 The category verification task produced significant levels of priming in the FA 
condition, which fits with other studies using this task (CITES). Unfortunately, all of the 
results concerning the effect of DA on priming from this experiment need to be 
approached with caution. Unlike other experiments, in this experiment DA had a rather 
large effect on amount of variability (as can be seen in Figure 3, error bars vary widely 
across condition). A test for equality of variances revealed that variance did differ as a 
function of group, F(4, 55) = 3.95, p < 0.05. The variance in the FA condition was 
substantially lower than variance in any of the DA conditions (i.e., relative to the FA 
condition, standard error increased by as many as four times in some DA conditions). As 
a result, this reduced the power of this experiment and suppressed the ability to detect 
effects that might otherwise have been revealed. This is especially relevant because in 
this experiment levels of priming were numerically lower in each of the DA conditions, 
relative to the FA condition. I will address this point in more detail in the general 
discussion. 
 The results concerning the effect of the secondary task on levels of priming were 
consistent with the results from the earlier experiments, which showed that priming was 
immune to a concurrent task. Importantly, it was found that none of the four DA 
conditions diminished priming relative to the FA condition. Further, it was found that 
the material-general and material-specific groups, and the high and low frequency 
groups produced levels of priming not different from zero (due to the high variability). 
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There was a numerical trend towards material-general secondary tasks to reduce 
priming more than material-specific tasks, although this trend failed to reach 
significance. Although these points are inconsistent with several theoretical 
considerations (specifically, the perceptual—conceptual hypothesis, material-specific 
interference, and the central bottleneck model), the limitations of this study prevent us 
from drawing any firm conclusions. 
 Despite the fact that the secondary task failed to produce deficits to implicit 
memory, it was again found that implicit retrieval produced robust global secondary task 
costs for accuracy and RT. The pattern generally mirrors one found in the first 
experiments of this study. The category verification task generally decreased accuracy 
and increased RT on the secondary task. Specifically, the implicit test significantly 
decreased accuracy for three of the four secondary task conditions; the MGLF condition 
was not disrupted, although the trend was in the predicted direction. RTs increased in 
both of the high frequency conditions, and for the MGLF. It was further found that 
performance was worse (lower accuracy, higher RTs) for the first item compared to the 
second item. This pattern of results generally fits with those found in the first 
experiments and demonstrates that the category verification task produced secondary 
task costs. However, the specific interest is in whether implicit retrieval produces 
secondary task costs. These costs were specifically measured by comparing old trials to 
new trials. Critically, I found that secondary items associated with old trials were no 
different (in terms of both accuracy and RTs) than secondary items associated with new 
trials. However, I must again treat this result with great caution because the DA 
conditions failed to demonstrate significant priming. Consequently, I can not draw 
unequivocal conclusions regarding the attentional costs of implicit retrieval in this case 
of category verification.
  
 
 
CHAPTER X 
POWER ANALYSES ACROSS EXPERIMENTS 
 
  The primary results focus on the effects of DA on priming. Because many 
of the conclusions about priming are based on null effects, power to detect DA effects in 
the present study must be considered. In order to increase power, I conducted two 
further analyses, using data combined across experiments. Given the limitations of 
Experiment 4, and the highly similar results in Experiments 1-3, these analyses 
combined data from first three experiments only. The first analysis was a one-factor 
ANOVA, with 5 levels (FA and the four DA conditions). This ANOVA revealed no effect of 
any of the DA conditions, F < 1. The second analysis was a t-test comparing the FA 
condition to all DA conditions combined. This analysis similarly revealed no effect of DA, 
t(238) = 0.84. This last analysis was also subjected to a formal power analysis (Cohen, 
1988). To determine power, I first obtained effect sizes from a recent study on DA and 
explicit memory (Lozito & Mulligan, 2006). In this study, DA significantly reduced 
memory performance on a standard recognition test and a perceptually-driven 
recognition test. The effect size of divided-attention on accuracy in the standard and 
perceptual recognition was d = 0.78 and d = 0.67, respectively, yielding an average effect 
size of d = 0.73. The power of the combined analysis to detect an effect of attention on 
priming of that size exceeded 0.99. In case effect sizes are generally smaller for implicit 
retrieval than for explicit retrieval, I conducted a second power analysis for an effect size 
two-thirds as large (d = 0.48). Power analysis revealed that the power to detect an effect 
of this magnitude was 0.83. Thus, the present study had substantial power to detect an 
  67
effect of attention on priming even if the effect was substantially smaller than that found 
with explicit recognition.
  
 
 
CHAPTER XI 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Numerous lines of theoretical and empirical work make specific predictions 
concerning the role of attention during implicit memory retrieval. No study, to date, has 
provided a systematic exploration of these issues, a gap that the present study was 
designed to fill. Specifically, I investigated whether perceptual or conceptual tests, or 
identification or production tests would be affected by a secondary task. I also examined 
whether the type of secondary task played a role in obtaining DA effects. Finally, I 
measured the secondary task costs produced by each of the implicit tasks, and by implicit 
retrieval. Before addressing the theoretical implications of the above set of experiments, 
I briefly revisit and summarize the several lines of research that motivated the present 
study. 
 Some prior theoretical and empirical work implies the automaticity hypothesis, 
which states that implicit retrieval is automatic. Other research proposes a distinction 
between perceptual and conceptual types of implicit tests and that posits that 
conceptual, but not perceptual, tests should be affected by dividing attention (the 
perceptual—conceptual hypothesis). Other research supports a distinction between 
identification and production types of implicit tests and further predicts that production, 
but not identification, tests should be disrupted by dividing attention (the 
identification—production hypothesis).. 
 Other theoretical frameworks argue that all memory retrieval can be disrupted by 
dividing attention, depending on the nature of the secondary task. These views suggest 
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that the characteristics of the secondary task are critical. One view posits that if the 
secondary task and memory test use the same types of materials (e.g., words), material-
specific interference will occur, and memory retrieval will be greatly affected by dividing 
attention (e.g., Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000). Another view (the central bottleneck 
model) holds that if the secondary task requires frequent responding (and consequently, 
frequent response selection), it should compete for the same central processes as 
memory retrieval, and produce DA effects (e.g., Pashler, 1994; Rohrer & Pashler, 2003). 
 Next, I consider the results of the experiments in light of these theoretical 
considerations. The general pattern of results was similar across all experiments. First, 
priming was found in the FA condition for each experiment. Second, dividing attention 
during retrieval produced no measureable effect on levels of priming in any of the 
experiments. This equality of priming held across all four individual DA conditions, 
implying that the exact nature of the distracter task, material-specific vs. material-
general tasks or high frequency vs. low response frequency, was unimportant: Implicit 
retrieval (as assessed by the amount of priming) was unaffected by any of the secondary 
tasks.  
The present set of results provides clear support for the automaticity hypothesis, 
a point that I will return to in more detail later in this section. These findings, however, 
are inconsistent with many of the above theoretical considerations. The finding that 
perceptual tests and identification tests were unaffected by a secondary task is in line 
with prediction from both the perceptual—conceptual hypothesis and the identification—
production hypothesis, respectively. Taken as a whole, however, it is clear that neither of 
these two hypotheses were supported because each hypothesis also predicts significant 
reductions for other types of tests. Specifically, neither conceptual nor production types 
of test were affected, refuting the central ideas of these respective hypotheses. The 
appearance of a trend towards a DA effect in word-stem completion (Figure 2) might be 
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taken as limited support for the identification—production hypothesis. However, overall 
there was no measurable effect of attention condition in this experiment, nor did the FA 
condition significantly differ from any individual DA condition. In addition, the results of 
the other production test (category exemplar production, Figure 3) demonstrated not the 
least effect of DA. Consequently, the entire pattern of results provides little support for 
the identification—production hypothesis. It must be noted that these results do not 
invalidate the general distinction between perceptual and conceptual tests, or between 
identification and production tests. Rather, they provide evidence that certain 
assumptions (and assertions) concerning these types of tests – namely, that conceptual 
and production tests place heavier demands on attention – appear to be incorrect. 
 These findings also fail to support the notion of material-specific interference. 
Specifically, it was found that participants in material-specific (word-based) groups had 
equivalent levels of priming to those in the material-general (number-based) groups, and 
further, that each of these groups showed equivalent levels of priming to the FA group. 
Although this account was developed in the explicit, episodic memory domain, the 
prediction that retrieval of words should be disrupted by a word-based secondary task 
still hold for implicit retrieval. Further, these results also fail to support the predictions 
of the central bottleneck model. Participants in the high frequency groups had equivalent 
priming to those in the low frequency group, and that both groups had equivalent 
priming to the FA group. The high frequency tasks (which require frequent response 
selection) should impair performance on the implicit tests (which similarly require 
selection of some response on every trial). Again, this model was not developed within 
the implicit domain, but the predictions generalize to the present circumstances. 
 As described in the introduction, the attention demands of memory tasks are also 
assessed by examining the effects of memory retrieval on the secondary task (that is, the 
secondary task costs). Across experiments, it was found that each implicit task produced 
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such costs. Specifically, each implicit test disrupted performance of each of the 
secondary tasks (as measured by decreased proportion correct, increased RTs, or both), 
relative to when the secondary task was performed alone. As a secondary point, I found 
that proportion correct was consistently affected across all experiments; RTs, however, 
were more consistently affected for the high frequency tasks. That is, most experiments 
found that one or both low frequency task showed no costs to RTs. This may indicate 
that the high frequency tasks are more consistently affected by the implicit task, or are 
more sensitive measures of secondary task costs (at least with respect to RTs). Because 
high-frequency tasks, by definition, require more responding, this yields more measures 
of RT across the entire task. The relatively small number of responses in the low-
frequency conditions might limit the utility of RTs as a dependent measure for the 
present low-frequency tasks (proportion correct is the typically the sole dependent 
measure). 
 Critically, the general secondary-task costs described above are the costs 
associated with the tasks in which priming is couched, but not the costs specifically 
associated with the implicit retrieval component of the tasks. That is, the general costs 
imply that generating category exemplars, solving word stems, identifying degraded 
stimuli, and verifying semantic facts might all require some amount of attention. 
However, that would not tell us that the implicit (priming) component of these tasks is 
attention-demanding. These costs are measured by comparing secondary task 
performance for trials associated with old test items and secondary task performance for 
trials associated with new test items. This is done because priming is measured by 
exploring the difference between performance for old trials and performance for new 
trials. Old trials are typically associated with a benefit in performance relative to new 
trials. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that only old trials reflect implicit retrieval, 
whereas new trials reflect a baseline of the task. Importantly, secondary task 
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performance was equivalent for old and new test trials, implying that implicit retrieval 
produced no specific costs to secondary task performance. . Further, Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3 demonstrated a (sometimes significant) trend such that old test trial improved 
secondary-task performance relative to new trials (for proportion correct in Experiment 
1 & 2, and RTs in Experiment 3). To a degree, secondary task performed seemed to get 
easier during old test trials. Further analysis revealed that the benefit for old trials 
relative to new trials was significant for the items presented synchronously with the 
implicit test item (i.e., first). This lack of specific costs (and, notably, improvements) is 
highly inconsistent with research from the explicit domain, which found large and robust 
secondary task costs produced by explicit retrieval (e.g., Craik et al., 1996; Craik et al. 
2000; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000a; Naveh-Benjamin et 
al., 2000b; Naveh-Benjamin & Guez, 2000). 
 The entire package of results is highly consistent and presents a very clear 
picture. As a group, these results provide support for the automaticity hypothesis. In 
other words, these results fit very well with the notion that that implicit retrieval is 
automatic, at least as implicit memory is reflected by repetition priming tasks. This claim 
of automatic implicit retrieval is based on criteria delineated in work on explicit memory 
retrieval (e.g., Craik et al., 1996; see also Hasher & Zacks, 1979, for a related view). To 
summarize, Baddeley et al. (1984) initially found that a secondary task failed to affect 
memory retrieval. They concluded that explicit retrieval was automatic. Craik et al. 
(1996) argued that a full assessment of the attentional demands of requires measuring 
both the effect of the secondary task on the memory test and secondary task costs 
produced by the memory test. Craik et al. found that although retrieval was unaffected, it 
produced robust secondary task costs. From this, they concluded that explicit retrieval 
was not automatic, but rather attention-demanding and obligatory. Unlike prior studies 
that have divided attention during implicit retrieval (e.g., Gooding et al., 1999; Helman & 
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Berry, 2003), this study includes both measures. It was argued that if costs are found for 
either the memory test or the secondary task (or both), then retrieval cannot be 
automatic. That (across all experiments) none of the secondary tasks significantly 
reduced levels of priming, and that implicit retrieval produced no decrement (and even 
yielded improvements) to secondary task performance suggests a heavy reliance on 
automatic processing during implicit retrieval. 
 Aside from the numerous lines of work that this supports, the finding of 
improvement of secondary task performance (for Experiments 1, 2, & 3) during old trials 
bears at lease some mention. Although this result was not predicted by most of the prior 
theorizing regarding attention and memory retrieval, there are two lines of research 
which anticipate this type of finding, one based on behavioral research the other based 
on neuroimaging results. First, Logan (1990) argued that one hallmark of automaticity is 
improvement in performance through repeated exposure. Repetition priming is observed 
by increases in proportion correct or decreases in RTs (i.e., better performance) for 
recently-experienced old items relative to newly-experienced items. Thus, this draws a 
distinct parallel between the mechanisms underlying repetition priming, and those 
underlying automaticity. According to this analysis, then, repetition priming arises as the 
result of increased automaticity for old items. In other words, for old trials, participants 
are experiencing the item for the second time, which should result in easier, more 
automatic processing of the item. Critically, this does not happen for new items because 
it is the first exposure to that item (within the context of the experiment). This predicts 
easier processing of secondary task items during old trials, relative to new trials and 
supports the pattern of results found in Experiments 1 and 2 (for proportion correct) and 
marginally in Experiment 3 (for RTs). 
 The second line of research consonant with decreased secondary-task costs for 
old items is research on neuroimaging of repetition priming. The typical finding is a 
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pattern of reduced activation for old trials, relative to new trials (e.g., Blaxton et al., 
1996; for a review, see Henson, 2005). In other words, priming appears to reduce 
activation in areas associated with the task in general. In one study, Blaxton et al., 
contrasted perceptual and conceptual types of tests. They found, generally, that 
conceptual and perceptual tasks led to differential brain activation (described briefly in 
the introduction) for new trials. Further, they found patterns of deactivations for old 
trials in some of those same regions. Specifically, old trials for perceptual tests led to 
deactivations in posterior regions, including occipital cortex; old trials for conceptual 
tests were associated with deactivations in left medial and superior temporal cortex, and 
left frontal cortex. This too is consistent with the notion that re-processing old items 
requires less effort, less expenditure of processing resources, and thus less interference 
to other ongoing processes (such as secondary tasks). 
 Despite producing a generally similar pattern of results as the other three 
experiments, Experiment 4 contained several limitations that limit my ability to draw 
conclusions. Firstly, baseline (i.e., new items) levels of performance were affected by DA 
in that RTs were significantly increased relative to FA. Secondly, the variability of the 
priming measure was much higher under DA than FA, so high in fact, that significant 
priming could not be detected in any of the DA conditions, even in the condition (MSLF) 
producing priming score comparable to the (significant) amount of priming found in the 
FA condition. Neither of these problems was present in any of the other three 
experiments. 
 Why was this pattern of high baseline performance and high variability under DA 
found in the present experiment, but not others? One possibility lies with the fact that 
the category exemplar production test yields a different dependent measure. All other 
experiments used proportion correct to measure priming; in this experiment, RT was 
used. It is known that dividing attention has a rather large effect on RTs, even under 
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conditions when it has no effect on accuracy rates (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1984). Further, 
Prull (2004) noted that differences in dependent measures can be critical in driving 
observed differences between types of implicit tests. Specifically, he argued that the 
majority of production tests use as their dependent measure proportion correct; many 
identification tests use reaction times. Prull argued that observed differences between 
identification and production tests might be partly explained by a difference in 
dependent measure, and not because of a fundamental difference in processing 
requirements. He specifically argued that observed age differences in priming (typically 
found for production test and not identification tests) might be more likely when 
priming is measured by proportion correct. Thus, observed age differences found for 
production, but not identification, tests might reflect the dependent measure and not the 
test. Prull equated the dependent measures (i.e., both the production and identification 
tests used RTs) and eliminated the typical age differences found for production tests. 
From this, one should be cautious about making claims concerning differences between 
identification and production types of tests when the dependent measures are not 
equated. I will return to this point shortly. 
 Because the category verification test uses RTs, and dividing attention is shown 
to have large effects on RTs, this indicates that RT might not be optimal for exploring 
attention effects on priming. The first problem was addressed by changing the 
dependant measure to percent change from baseline. Because this yielded the same 
pattern of results as the raw priming scores, the scaling artifact was not a major concern. 
The second problem was more severe because it necessarily decreased any ability to find 
effects. This problem was especially relevant because in this experiment priming was 
numerically diminished across most of the DA conditions (and was even negative in 
some conditions). 
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 Complete analysis of the role of attention during implicit retrieval requires the 
inclusion of a test that is conceptual in nature and requires stimulus identification. 
Category verification is the prototypical test that fits into this category, and should be 
included, but its current dependent measure poses a problem. How, then, to use this test 
and correct for this problem in future studies? One possibility would be to impose strict 
time limits in which participants must respond. For example, in the FA condition, 
average response times were approximately 900 ms. As a result, participants could be 
forced to try to respond within 900 ms. If the participants responds within the time (and 
answers the question correctly), the trial is scored as correct. If the participant fails to 
respond (or answers the question incorrectly), the trial is scored as incorrect. This 
transforms the dependent measure to proportion correct and presumably would 
eliminate the issue of changes in variability under DA. Further, it would still allow for 
inclusion of the most typical conceptual, identification type of test. Because average 
response time is 900 ms, this should yield approximately 50% of trials correct, and 50% 
incorrect. Further, because old trials are responded to more quickly, this should yield a 
higher proportion correct for old items compared to new items, thus demonstrating 
priming. Critically, this version of this test is still classified as conceptual and 
identification. Because RTs slow under DA, it is expected that baseline levels of 
performance should change under DA (i.e., proportion correct should be lower under 
DA). However, this problem could again be addressed through the use of a proportion 
change measure in addition to raw proportion correct (as was done in Experiment 4). 
 One final issue related to Experiment 4 is the amount of priming observed. Raw 
priming was measured to be only 35 ms, which translates to a 3.57% change in 
performance relative to baseline. This implies that for this task, priming was a very small 
percentage of total performance. Observing differences from such a small improvement 
in performance might be challenging. This provides further impetus for altering the 
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dependent measure to proportion correct, which (typically, and in the present 
experiments) yielded more robust levels of priming. 
 As stated, the simplest (and most complete in explaining results across all 
experiments) explanation of these results is that implicit memory is automatic. It must 
be noted that I specifically assessed implicit memory with repetition priming of single 
items. This represents the most common manner in which to study implicit memory, but 
certainly not the only method. For example, implicit memory can be further explored 
using procedural learning tasks, for which participants learn a new task or sequence. 
Along these lines, some researchers have argued that procedural retrieval occurs 
implicitly (e.g., Shanks & Channon, 2002). That is, participants do not consciously 
retrieve the cognitive or motor skills necessary to perform the task. The study by Helman 
and Berry (2003) is relevant here. In this study (described in detail earlier), participants 
studied letter sequences that fit with an artificial grammar. Later, participants were 
tested for their memory of this grammar either explicitly (a recognition test of previously 
presented sequences) or implicitly (liking ratings of sequences that fit or did not fit the 
grammar). Participants took the test under FA or DA. It was critically found that DA did 
not reduce implicit memory for the grammar sequences, but did reduce explicit memory. 
This furthers the assertion that implicit retrieval in general is automatic. 
 In the present study, I chose the four most prototypical types of implicit tests to 
fit each of the classifications discussed. Further, I studied priming of single items 
(words). Even within the realm of repetition priming tasks, there are other issues to 
consider. First, one could use other types of repetition priming tests to ensure that these 
results generalize. Second, one could use auditory analogs of the present tests (i.e., 
change test modalities). Third, one could study repetition priming of other non-word 
stimuli (e.g., pictures). Fourth, one could examine implicit memory for relationships 
between items (relational priming). In the explicit domain, relational memory (memory 
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for source, context, order, or other associative information) is often viewed as being 
more demanding than item memory, because of its heavier reliance on recollective 
processing (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 2000; Troyer, Winocur, Craik, & Moscovitch, 1999; see 
Yonelinas, 2000, for a review; cf. Troyer & Craik, 2001, Experiment 2). Thus, implicit 
tests that stress relationships between items might be more attention-demanding during 
retrieval. A final area would be to study repetition priming of novel stimuli (e.g., non-
word, abstract pictures). Relative to verbal materials, priming of novel stimuli are more 
likely to show effects of DA at encoding (e.g., Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990), suggesting 
greater demands in processing. Thus it is possible that novel stimuli might represent a 
circumstance that would increase attentional demands of the implicit test and produce 
DA effects to either priming or the secondary task. On the other hand, Logan’s (1990) 
analysis yields a different prediction. According to this position, old items are processed 
more automatically than new items. The potential gains in automaticity due to a single 
presentation should be greater for novel materials than well-known materials. This 
would imply that, for novel stimuli, the increased automaticity and reduced secondary 
task costs should be even greater, relative to the baseline condition at test. As a result, 
the improvements to secondary task performance for old trials relative to new trials 
found in several experiments here might be larger and found more consistently with 
novel stimuli. 
 The present study is aimed at being the most (to-date) comprehensive 
exploration into the role of attention during the retrieval component of implicit memory. 
The overwhelming majority of research into attention and implicit memory has focused 
on the study phase of implicit memory. This study used several types of implicit tests, 
several types of secondary tasks (all based on prior theoretical considerations), and 
divided attention during the retrieval phase only. The lack of DA effects on implicit 
retrieval and the lack of secondary task costs produced by implicit retrieval have 
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significant bearing on these considerations. Finally, this study represents the first step 
towards an understanding of whether retrieval processes in implicit memory act on 
principles of automatic or controlled processing. Although the implications are clear, this 
study plus future research will help fully address this central issue. 
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Table 1: 
Experiment 1 implicit memory performance (Proportion Old, Proportion 
New, Proportion Priming) as a function of attention condition 
 Old New Priming 
FA .61 .36 .25 
MGHF .79 .53 .26 
MGLF .72 .46 .26 
MSHF .78 .54 .24 
MSLF .74 .52 .21 
Total .73 .48 .25 
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Table 2: 
Experiment 1 secondary Task Performance (Proportion Correct & RTs) as a 
function of attention condition and the status of the trial 
 Attention Trial Status  
Condition FA DA Old New 
MGHF .99 .94 .93 .94 
MGLF .98 .91 -- -- 
MSHF .95 .80 .84 .78 
MSLF .95 .81 -- -- 
Proportion 
Correct 
Total .97 .87 .89 .86 
MGHF 1233 1395 1453 1421 
MGLF 1455 1494 -- -- 
MSHF 1511 1730 1723 1736 
MSLF 1660 1645 -- -- 
RT 
Total 1465 1566 1588 1579 
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Table 3: 
Experiment 2 implicit memory performance (Proportion Old, Proportion 
New, Proportion Priming) as a function of attention condition 
 Old New Priming 
FA .54 .29 .25 
MGHF .51 .29 .22 
MGLF .50 .28 .22 
MSHF .46 .27 .19 
MSLF .47 .30 .18 
Total .50 .28 .21 
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Table 4: 
Experiment 2 secondary Task Performance (Proportion Correct & RTs) as a 
function of attention condition and the status of the trial 
 Attention Trial Status  
Condition FA DA Old New 
MGHF .99 .86 .88 .85 
MGLF .95 .85 -- -- 
MSHF .99 .84 .86 .83 
MSLF .91 .80 -- -- 
Proportion 
Correct 
Total .96 .84 .87 .84 
MGHF 1294 1598 1598 1597 
MGLF 1366 1464 -- -- 
MSHF 1497 1709 1709 1709 
MSLF 1617 1581 -- -- 
RT 
Total 1443 1588 1653 1653 
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Table 5: 
Experiment 3 implicit memory performance (Proportion Old, Proportion 
New, Proportion Priming) as a function of attention condition 
 Old New Priming 
FA .48 .33 .15 
MGHF .44 .29 .15 
MGLF .45 .29 .16 
MSHF .47 .32 .15 
MSLF .51 .35 .16 
Total .47 .32 .15 
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Table 6: 
Experiment 3 secondary Task Performance (Proportion Correct & RTs) as a 
function of attention condition and the status of the trial 
 Attention Trial Status  
Condition FA DA Old New 
MGHF .99 .83 .82 .83 
MGLF .98 .79 -- -- 
MSHF .96 .62 .63 .61 
MSLF .88 .76 -- -- 
Proportion 
Correct 
Total .95 .75 .73 .72 
MGHF 1211 1589 1576 1599 
MGLF 1396 1422 -- -- 
MSHF 1537 1838 1838 1843 
MSLF 1567 1538 -- -- 
RT 
Total 1428 1597 1701 1721 
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Table 7: 
Experiment 4 implicit memory performance (New RT, Old RT, Priming RT) 
as a function of attention condition 
 New RT Old RT Priming RT 
FA 939 903 36 
MGHF 1135 1164 -31 
MGLF 1182 1180 2 
MSHF 1348 1353 -5 
MSLF 1284 1248 36 
Total 117 1170 8 
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Table 8: 
Experiment 4 secondary Task Performance (Proportion Correct & RTs) as a 
function of attention condition and the status of the trial 
 Attention Trial Status  
Condition FA DA Old New 
MGHF 1.00 .93 .93 .93 
MGLF .96 .94 -- -- 
MSHF .94 .83 .82 .82 
MSLF .95 .82 -- -- 
Proportion 
Correct 
Total .96 .88 .88 .88 
MGHF 1300 1468 1467 1468 
MGLF 1288 1368 -- -- 
MSHF 1543 1733 1736 1731 
MSLF 1627 1603 -- -- 
RT 
Total 1440 1543 1602 1599 
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Figure 1: 
Priming (Proportion Old – Proportion New) on the perceptual identification 
test as a function of attention condition 
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Figure 2: 
Proportion correct for secondary task performance (MGHF and MSHF) in 
Experiment 1 as a function of old/new status of the trial and whether the 
item was presented first or second 
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
First Second
Order
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
C
or
re
ct
Old
New
 
  90
Figure 3: 
Priming (Proportion Old – Proportion New) on the word-stem completion 
test as a function of attention condition 
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Figure 4: 
Proportion correct for secondary task performance (MGHF and MSHF) in 
Experiment 2 as a function of old/new status of the trial and whether the 
item was presented first or second 
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Figure 5: 
Priming (Proportion Old – Proportion New) on the category exemplar 
production test as a function of attention condition 
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Figure 6: 
RT (in ms) for secondary task performance (MGHF and MSHF) in 
Experiment 3 as a function of old/new status of the trial and whether the 
item was presented first or second 
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Figure 7: 
Priming (New RT – Old RT) on the category verification test as a function of 
attention condition 
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Appendix A: 
Awareness Questionnaire 
Awareness Questionnaire (Perceptual Identification) 
 1. What do you think was the purpose of the task you just completed? 
 2. Did you think there was anything unusual about the words that were 
 presented? 
 3. Did you notice any connection between the words you heard earlier and the 
 task you just performed? 
 4. If the subject says 'yes.', then ask: 'What did you notice?' 
 5. Were you aware of this connection at the time you were identifying the words, 
 or did you only become aware of it after I began to ask these questions? 
 6. If the subject noticed that some of the responses corresponded to the words 
 presented earlier, ask: 'Did you consciously try to use words from the earlier part 
 of the experiment to help you identify words presented in the last part of the 
 experiment?' 
NOTE: YOU ARE NOT FINISHED WITH THE QUESTIONNAIRE UNTIL YOU, THE 
EXPERIMENTER, CAN ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 
 1. Was the subject aware, at the time, of the connection between the two parts? 
    Yes / No  (circle one) 
 2. Did the subject consciously try to use the words from the earlier part as 
 responses in the last part? 
    Yes / No  (circle one) 
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